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Over-indebtedness is a current phenomenon, which has been at public interest particularly since the 
last financial crisis. Over-indebtedness causes negative social and economic implications for 
households, which at worst can lead to social exclusion and poverty. Over-indebtedness increases 
also lenders’ risks of credit defaults and poses a risk for the social and economic stability of the 
society, due to which it is important to research the phenomenon to prevent and restrict the growth of 
it. Over-indebtedness has been increasing steadily in Finland during last decades and has continued 
its growth even after the last financial crisis. In 2016, also the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
warned about the risks of the growing household indebtedness in Finland. 
 
This study goes through over-indebtedness in theoretical framework and empirical findings of the 
determinants of over-indebtedness with a literary survey and statistical research. Traditional economic 
theory associates household over-indebtedness with uncertainty related to forecasting future income 
and according to the theory households borrow to smooth income fluctuations during their lifecycle. 
Over-indebtedness is a consequence of macroeconomic shocks that inevitably concern some 
proportion of households. Behavioral economics has recently contributed significantly on the research 
of over-indebtedness. Behavioral theories present over-indebtedness as a consequence of 
consumers’ bounded rationality, which is caused by behavioral biases, inconsistent time-preferences 
and self-control problems. Due to bounded rationality and self-control problems, consumers end up 
consuming more than the optimal level on current period and accumulate too much debt compared to 
their income and wealth. Over-consumption and over-indebtedness increase household’s financial 
burden, which leads to arrears and repayment defaults, when the disposable income is not sufficient 
to cover all expenses. Arrears and defaults are also impacted by household’s equity and particularly 
decreases in its value, which hinders realizing assets in order to repay debt. 
 
The study utilizes the wide EU-SILC micro-data in statistical estimation, and finds evidence 
supporting the importance of the risk factors identified in previous literature in causing over-
indebtedness. Household’s low level of income and education are major risk factors, since they lower 
the lifecycle resources. Level of education and the financial literacy accompanied by it have also an 
impact on the sustainability of household’s financial decisions. Households’ high expenses compared 
to their income increase their financial burden and increase the risk of arrears. Factors identified to 
increase the financial burden include living in rented accommodation and careless borrowing, in 
addition to low level of income. Increasing financial literacy is found to impact positively the 
sustainability of household’s consumption and saving decisions and that it is also associated with 
smaller impact of behavioral biases and self-control issues. 
 
The study supports focusing policy measures to improving financial literacy, because the common 
level of it is low particularly among households with the lowest income levels. The risk of over-
indebtedness should also be restricted by regulating the supply of instant loans and other easily 
available high-cost credits more strictly. Founding a positive credit register is seen to have strong 
basis that would promote responsible borrowing and improve households’ understanding of their 
financial situation. 
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Ylivelkaantuminen on ajankohtainen ilmiö, jonka tutkiminen on noussut mielenkiinnon kohteeksi 
erityisesti viimeisimmän finanssikriisin jälkeen. Ylivelkaantuminen aiheuttaa kotitalouksille negatiivisia 
sosiaalisia ja taloudellisia vaikutuksia, jotka pahimmillaan johtavat syrjäytymiseen yhteiskunnasta ja 
köyhyyteen. Ylivelkaantuminen kasvattaa myös lainanantajien riskejä luottotappioista ja aiheuttaa 
riskin yhteiskunnan sosiaaliselle ja taloudelliselle vakaudelle, minkä vuoksi ilmiön tutkiminen sen 
kasvun ennakoimiseksi ja rajoittamiseksi on tärkeää. Ylivelkaantuminen on kasvanut Suomessa 
tasaisesti viimeisten vuosikymmenten aikana ja jatkanut kasvuaan myös viimeisimmän finanssikriisin 
jälkeen. Vuonna 2016 myös European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) varoitti Suomea korkeaan ja 
kasvavaan kotitalouksien velkaantumiseen liittyvistä riskeistä. 
 
Tutkimus läpikäy ylivelkaantumista teoreettisessa viitekehyksessä sekä empiirisiä tuloksia 
ylivelkaantumisen syntymisestä kirjallisuuskatsauksen ja tilastollisen tutkimuksen avulla. Perinteinen 
talousteoreettinen näkemys kotitalouksien ylivelkaantumisesta liittyy tulevaisuuden tulojen 
ennustamisen epävarmuuteen ja teorian mukaan kotitaloudet velkaantuvat tasoittaakseen 
tulovaihteluita elinkaaren aikana. Ylivelkaantuminen on seurausta erityisesti makrotaloudellisista 
sokeista, jotka koskettavat välttämättä osaa kotitalouksista. Behavioraalinen taloustiede on 
kontribuoinut viimeaikoina merkittäväsi ylivelkaantumisen tutkimukseen. Behavioraaliset teoriat 
esittävät, että ylivelkaantuminen on seurausta kuluttajien rajoitetusta rationaalisuudesta, joka johtuu 
taloudelliseen päätöksentekoon vaikuttavista behavioraalisista harhoista, epäjohdonmukaisista 
aikapreferensseistä ja itsekuriongelmista. Rajoitetun rationaalisuuden ja itsekuriongelmien vuoksi 
kuluttajat päätyvät kuluttamaan kuluvalla periodilla enemmän kuin olisi optimaalista ja kerryttävät 
tuloihinsa ja varoihinsa nähden liikaa velkaa. Ylikulutus ja -velkaantuminen lisäävät kotitalouden 
taloudellista ahdinkoa, joka johtaa maksurästeihin ja takaisinmaksun laiminlyönteihin, kun 
käytettävissä olevat tulot eivät riitä kattamaan menoja. Maksurästeihin ja laiminlyönteihin vaikuttaa 
myös kotitalouden nettovarallisuus ja erityisesti sen arvon lasku, mikä vaikeuttaa varallisuuden 
realisoimista velkojen takaisinmaksamiseksi.     
 
Tutkimus hyödyntää tilastollisessa estimoinnissa laajaa EU-SILC mikroaineistoa, jonka avulla 
löydetään todisteita aikaisemman kirjallisuuden tunnistamien riksitekijöiden merkityksestä 
ylivelkaantumisen synnyssä. Kotitalouksien matala tulo- ja koulutustaso ovat merkittäviä riskitekijöitä, 
sillä ne madaltavat kotitalouden elämänkaaren resursseja. Koulutustasolla ja sen myötä kertyvillä 
taloustaidoilla on myös merkitys kotitalouksien taloudellisten päätösten kannattavuuteen. 
Kotitalouksien suuret tuloihin suhteutetut menot kasvattavat taloudellista ahdinkoa ja kasvattavat 
kotitalouksien riskiä maksuhäiriöistä. Taloudellista ahdinkoa kasvattaviksi tekijöiksi identifioidaan 
matalan tulotason lisäksi mm. vuokralla asuminen sekä huoleton lainaaminen. Taloudellisen 
lukutaidon kasvattamisella nähdään olevan positiivinen vaikutus kotitalouksien kulutus- ja 
velkaantumispäätösten kannattavuuteen, sekä yhteys behavioraalisten harhojen ja itsekuriongelmien 
merkityksen vähentymiseen. 
 
Tutkimus kannattaa politiikkatoimien keskittämistä talouslukutaidon kehittämiseen, sillä sen taso 
yleisesti erityisesti matalan koulutustason kotitalouksissa on matala. Lisäksi ylivelkaantumisen riskiä 
tulisi rajoittaa säätelemällä tiukemmin pikalainojen ja muiden helposti saatavilla olevien korkean koron 
lainojen tarjontaa. Positiivisen luottorekisterin perustamiselle nähdään vahvoja perusteita, jotka 
edesauttaisivat vastuullista luotonantoa sekä kotitalouksien ymmärrystä taloudellisesta tilanteestaan. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Household indebtedness has been increasing for decades in the developed countries and is 
currently record-high also in Finland. Even though indebtedness is a natural part of lifecycle, 
monitoring and restricting the growth of it is necessary to avoid the consequences over-
indebtedness has not only on the debtors and lenders, but also on the society as whole. Over-
indebtedness poses a social and economic threat to the welfare of over-indebted individuals, 
and widespread household over-indebtedness can even threaten the economic stability of the 
whole society. Over-indebted households are vulnerable to economic shocks and cannot 
endure adverse income fluctuation, which is then reflected to the whole society as credit 
losses, diminished aggregated demand and results in cutbacks in production. There is 
currently a growing concern of widespread household over-indebtedness since it not only 
prolongs the recovery from any economic downturn, but also has played a major role in 
triggering financial crisis in the past. Period of rapid growth of indebtedness preceded both 
the early 1990’s depression and the 2008 financial crisis. While the growth rate of 
indebtedness in Finland slowed down after the last financial crisis, the level of indebtedness 
has still been increasing ever since. The last financial crisis in particular outlined the 
importance of examining the development of household indebtedness and understanding the 
determinants associated with excessive indebting. Understanding the causes and 
consequences of over-indebtedness is at public interest. Over-indebtedness has been identified 
as major threat to sustainable growth also at the EU level and The European Commission has 
raised concern about the development of it and defined over-indebtedness as one of the key 
challenges in reaching the targets of reducing poverty and social exclusion. 
 
Recent trends in the credit markets have accelerated the hazardous development of over-
indebtedness. Households’ conception of their indebtedness becomes easily obscure with low 
interest levels, new forms of instant consumer credit and increasing housing company loans. 
Households are encouraged to finance consumption with credit and constantly offered easy 
and instant credit that can be taken with little to no consideration. Consumers assessed not 
creditworthy enough to borrow from banks, can rely on alternative high-cost credit offered by 
other institutions. These households tend to also lack knowledge to make informed financial 
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decisions and may not comprehend the extent of their commitments. Policy responses to the 
adverse development of credit markets have not yet been proven successful and new manners 
to tackle the issue need to be developed. Adjusting policy measures accordingly is important 
in order to alleviate the risks that over-indebtedness poses for the stability of the economy.  
 
Causes for over-indebtedness are traditionally searched from households’ socio-economic 
characteristics and the circumstances they are in (see, for example Betti et al. (2007) and 
Disney et al. (2008)). Resent theoretical and empirical research on behavioral economics has 
gained more ground in explaining household over-indebtedness as a consequence of 
household’s bounded rationality. Behavioral economics studies the impact of behavioral, i.e. 
psychological, cognitive, social and emotional factors on economic decision-making. Recent 
theoretical findings (see, for example Shefrin and Thaler (1988) and Thaler and Benartzi 
(2004)) model the influential biases and heuristics within households’ decision-making 
process and form the basis for empirical experiments that examine the impact of behavioral 
phenomena on households’ decision-making and over-indebtedness (see, for example Brown 
et al. (2005), Gathergood (2012) and Kilborn (2005)). Research finds strong evidence 
supporting the importance of behavioral factors on over-borrowing and financial difficulties. 
 
This study aims to reveal determinants that increase household’s risk of over-indebtedness 
and discuss the manners in which over-indebtedness is developed among Finnish households. 
The goal of the study is to form a comprehensive description of over-indebtedness and reveal 
the risk groups it. The study examines over-indebtedness from different viewpoints and 
presents both theoretical and empirical findings on the field. The phenomenon is first 
examined with comprehensive literature survey that presents theoretical and empirical 
findings of the nature of over-indebtedness, after which the findings are tested with an 
empirical research. The empirical research examines the current status of household over-
indebtedness in Finland and analyses the determinants of the risk of over-indebtedness and 
arrears. The empirical research will mainly focus on risk groups of over-indebtedness among 
Finnish households but also make comparisons to other European countries. Policy measures 
targeted to prevent or alleviate over-indebtedness are also evaluated in the light of the results 
found. This study will utilize the extensive EU-SILC micro-data that contains specific 
household and individual level characteristics and combines them with relevant subjective 
measures of financial difficulties. The approach is based on survey data that is suitable for 
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revealing risk of over-indebtedness before household’s financial difficulties have resulted in 
defaults.  
 
This study is structured as following. The second chapter discusses the concept of over-
indebtedness by first presenting three models of measuring over-indebtedness and different 
definitions of over-indebtedness derived from these measures. The second section of the 
second chapter then discusses the consequences of over-indebtedness for individuals, lenders 
and the society. The third section of the second chapter presents the current status of over-
indebtedness in Finland and previous studies on the field. The third chapter describes over-
indebtedness from a theoretical point of view. The first section of the third chapter presents 
the traditional theory of lifecycle hypothesis (LCH) and explains indebtedness as a natural 
part of household’s lifecycle, while discussing the implications of excessive indebtedness. 
The second section of the third chapter then presents theoretical findings of behavioral 
economics that explain household over-indebtedness. The third section of chapter 3 then 
presents the ability-to-pay and negative equity theories that explain the decision-making 
leading to arrears and payment defaults and discusses the seriousness of different 
circumstances. The chapter 4 presents a comprehensive literary survey of empirical evidence 
of over-indebtedness. The chapter is divided into four sections, the first of which presents 
research related to household socio-economic characteristics and circumstances that are 
associated with increased risk of over-indebtedness. The second section of the fourth chapter 
presents empirical findings of the importance of financial literacy on financial decision-
making and alleviating the risk of over-indebtedness. The third section focuses on findings of 
behavioral economics and discusses the impact of behavioral biases on household over-
indebtedness. The fourth section of the chapter 4 then presents evidence on the importance of 
over-commitment on the risk of over-indebtedness and findings of the impact of credit market 
policies. The chapter 5 then presents empirical research conducted of household over-
indebtedness in Finland. This study utilizes European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) data and examines the determinants of over-indebtedness drawn from 
the theoretical findings and literature survey. Comparative study of the determinants of over-
indebtedness will also be presented. The research methods will be described in further detail 
in the chapter 5. The sixth chapter then goes through the results and draws conclusions of the 
risk groups of over-indebtedness. The policy measures targeted to fight over-indebtedness are 
also presented and evaluated on the light of the findings of the research. The study is then 
concluded in the chapter 7.  
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2 OVER-INDEBTEDNESS  
 
 
The following sections present over-indebtedness as a phenomenon. This chapter first 
presents three models of measuring over-indebtedness. In the previous literature, there is no 
consensus on the definition of over-indebtedness or where can one draw the line between 
indebtedness and excessive indebtedness (Betti et al. 2007, 138). Suggestion for common 
European definition for over-indebtedness, which is prepared by task force of the European 
Commission for enabling pan-European comparability, is also presented. The second section 
will then discuss the consequences that over-indebtedness has for households, lenders and the 
society and in the third section the current status of household over-indebtedness in Finland is 
presented.  
 
2.1 Measuring over-indebtedness 
 
As there is no consensus on how over-indebtedness should be defined, there is no universal 
method to measure it either. Three approaches to modeling over-indebtedness are presented in 
the literature: objective, subjective and administrative models (Betti et al. 2007, 138). The 
three models of measuring over-indebtedness are presented in the following section 2.1.1 
after which a proposal for a common definition of over-indebtedness of European 
Commission’s task force is presented in the section 2.1.2. 
 
2.1.1 Objective, subjective and administrative models 
 
Objective model of measuring over-indebtedness is based on quantitative measures of 
excessive borrowing and spending that cause households’ inability to repay or service debt. 
Subjective model is based on households’ subjective judgment of their ability to service and 
repay debt and regards households over-indebted if they have to sacrifice their standard of 
living in order to pay back or service their liabilities. Administrative model measures over-
indebtedness based on arrears and defaults that have been officially registered or declared in 
court. Administrative approach does not take the risk caused by household’s unsustainable 
debt or consumption levels into consideration. (Betti et al. 2007, 138, 142.) 
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Objective indicators of over-indebtedness measure households’ excessive borrowing and 
spending that increase households’ risk of over-indebtedness and defaulting. Objective 
indicators of over-indebtedness describe household’s unsustainable financial situation that has 
necessarily not yet resulted in defaults or bankruptcy. The most common objective indicators 
of over-indebtedness measure households’ unsustainable levels of consumption to income, 
debt to assets or credit-service to income ratio. High consumption to income ratio may reveal 
unsustainable spending habits that may lead to excessive levels of debt if consumption is at 
least partly financed with borrowing. High consumption to income ratio may also indicate 
that household does not save enough of its disposable income in order to prepare for adverse 
income shocks. Households with irresponsible spending habits may have little to no liquid 
resources to cover unexpected expenses or repay their commitments when facing an adverse 
income shock, which makes them very vulnerable for adverse economic fluctuations. High 
debt to assets ratio measures household’s negative equity position, where household is not 
able to cover its debt with own assets. Very high negative equity position indicates that 
household has an increased risk of defaulting on commitments if it faces adverse economic 
shocks. Debt servicing to income ratio is another commonly used measure for excessive debt 
levels. High debt servicing expenditure to income ratio indicates that household is struggling 
with debt repayment and has an increased risk of falling into arrears or defaulting on 
commitments. (Betti et al. 2007, 142–143, 150–151) 
 
The difficulty in using objective measures is that the critical levels of over-indebtedness are 
hard to define. Betti et al. (2007, 142–143) argue that even though objective measures can 
reveal over-consumption and over-borrowing well, over-indebted households cannot be 
unambiguously identified with the most commonly used objective measures. Economic 
theory predicts that consumption to income ratios vary through the lifecycle. The lifecycle 
hypothesis (LCH) that is discussed in more detail in the following chapter, assumes that 
consumption to income over the lifecycle has a U-shape where the ratio first decreases with 
age as consumer’s income increases and then again increases as income declines towards 
retirement and old age. In other words, consumer’s consumption to income ratio is assumed 
to depend on age and a single critical value might not describe over-indebtedness correctly. 
Betti et al. (2007, 142–143) also show that over-indebted households tend to actually have 
lower than average consumption to income level, indicating that over-indebted households 
have already been forced to cut down consumption to pay their outstanding liabilities.  
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Betti et al. (2007, 142–143) argue that major problem of using debt to assets and debt-
servicing expenditure to income ratios as measures of over-indebtedness are that they 
disregard some actually over-indebted households and consider some households over-
indebted that actually have a stable financial situation. They argue that high debt to assets 
ratio alone does not take into consideration household’s capability to repay debt with current 
available resources. On the other hand, some households with net wealth might not be able to 
realize their assets and struggle with debt repayment due to insufficient current resources. 
Davydoff et al. (2008, 45) also argue that debt to income ratio itself does not indicate over-
indebtedness and borrowers are concerned only about debt servicing to income ratios. Debt 
servicing to income ratio on the other hand regards also extreme risk-averse behavior as sign 
of over-indebtedness. Extreme risk-averse consumers may have high debt servicing to income 
ratios even if they have sufficient current resources because they are willing to restrict their 
current consumption in order to repay debt as fast as possible. (Betti et al. 2007, 142–143, 
150–151.) Davydoff et al. (2008, 45) also point out that the debt servicing to income ratio 
does not take into consideration other than credit commitment related payments and basing 
the analysis on the measure alone would give an incomplete picture of household’s financial 
situation.  
 
Subjective approach of over-indebtedness assumes that households are the most competent to 
judge their own financial situation and that their own perception is the most accurate way to 
model over-indebtedness (Betti et al. 2007, 144). Subjective measures of over-indebtedness 
can be collected with a household survey study alike the one used in this research (EU-SILC). 
According to subjective measures, household is identified as over-indebted if it judges its 
financial commitments as a burden or that it is struggling to repay debt. Different surveys use 
different questions to reveal over-indebtedness. The indicators of over-indebtedness may 
include questions of subjective financial burden, household’s liquidity situation or arrears. By 
using a subjective measure of financial burden to identify unsustainable debt to asset positions 
one can avoid the difficulties identified with objective measures. Over-indebtedness is 
strongly associated with illiquidity and surveys attempt to reveal the household-specific 
thresholds, when households are no longer able to make ends meet without sacrificing its 
standard of living. Arrears are rather an objective measure than a subjective one, however 
when they are collected with a survey also minor arrears that have been repaid and not 
resulted in registered defaults are taken into consideration. Self-reported arrears may reveal 
also less severe illiquidity issues. 
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Due to subjective measures depend on household’s own judgment of their financial situation 
they can over- or underestimate households’ actual financial situation and the sustainability of 
their debt position. Disney et al. (2008) argue that instead of reflecting household’s own 
financial situation, self-reported measures of over-indebtedness may reflect the overall 
economic situation and household’s judgment of the severity of the current economic 
circumstances (Disney et al. 2008, 4, 51). Keese (2012, 127) argues that subjective over-
indebtedness is dependent on household’s current and expected financial situation, their 
attitude towards debt and general characteristics such as gender or culture.  
 
Administrative model of over-indebtedness reveals households’ current unsustainable 
financial situation but cannot actually predict household’s vulnerability to adverse shocks 
(Disney et al. 2008, 4). Administrative measures are usually based on statics on debt 
settlement including debt settlement processes, insolvencies, bankruptcies, sequestrations or 
summonses. Administrative measures reveal severe over-indebtedness that has led to arrears 
and defaults and the severity of the situation with the amount of outstanding debt or the length 
of the default situation. Over-indebted individuals may however have prolonged financial 
difficulties long before their first payment defaults due to consumers tend to avoid bad credit 
records even by borrowing more in an already difficult financial situation. Using registered 
debt settlement as a measurement of over-indebtedness captures only individuals whose 
financial problems have already become severe. This group of individuals covers only a small 
proportion of over-indebted individuals. (Davydoff et al. 2008, 42–43.) Davydoff et al. (2008, 
32) show in their report that administrative measures are commonly used at national level 
statistics. They find that the most common measures used by governments in EU member 
states are administrative and legal measures based on registered debt settlement processes or 
arrears. The processes and juridical systems however differ between nations causing a lack of 
comparability across countries (Davydoff et al. 2008, 36; Betti et al. 2007, 142). 
 
2.1.2 Towards a common European definition of over-indebtedness 
 
Due to there is no consensus on measuring over-indebtedness and to enable statistical 
comparison across countries and analyzing the effects of policy measures, a group of experts 
has prepared a report for the use of the European Commission to define common definition 
and measures of over-indebtedness. The report ‘Towards a common operational European 
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definition of over-indebtedness’ reviews literature on the causes and nature of over-
indebtedness and aims at providing foundation for common European definition of over-
indebtedness, give an overview of political, administrative and legal approaches to over-
indebtedness as well as providing a handbook for policy makers in EU member states for 
measuring and tackling over-indebtedness. (Davydoff et al. 2008, 5–6.) 
 
Davydoff et al. (2008, 34–37) find in their report that the definitions of over-indebtedness 
vary between European countries and that none of the countries surveyed have an official 
definition or measurement of over-indebtedness. They summarize the most common elements 
in the definitions of over-indebtedness and argue that the common definition should be 
measured at household level, since the income of household members can be assumed to be 
pooled. In addition, only contracted commitments should be considered when considering the 
causes of over-indebtedness and informal commitments excluded. According to their 
proposal, household should be defined as over-indebted if it is unable to meet recurring 
expenses and is unable to meet contracted commitments without reducing its standard of 
living. Being defined as over-indebted should indicate that household has structural and 
persistent financial difficulties instead of temporary ones and suffers from illiquidity, 
meaning that household is unable to alleviate the situation by realizing assets or borrowing. 
(Davydoff et al. 2008, 37.) 
 
Since over-indebtedness is multi-dimensional, Davydoff et al. (2008) suggest that over-
indebtedness should be measured with multiple indicators instead of using only a single 
indicator. Their report reviews commonly used indicators in European studies: statistics on 
arrears and debt settlement, surveys of households’ financial burden and other indicators 
including objective measures (e.g. debt to income and debt service to income ratio) and 
register based measures (e.g. users of debt service agencies). The report analyses the 
indicators based on their information content, comparability, reliability, frequency, coverage 
and usage. The suggestion for common European definition of an over-indebted household is 
that household (1) has comparably high expenses to income that force it below the poverty 
threshold, (2) has structural arrears, (3) is burdened by monthly payments of financial 
commitments, (4) considers its payment capacity at least difficult and (5) suffers from 
illiquidity and thus is unable to meet unexpected expenses and is not able to repair its finances 
by resorting to financial or non-financial assets or further borrowing. Households at risk of 
over-indebtedness fulfill the five measures mentioned apart from that they are only 
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approaching the poverty threshold or the minimum cost of living but have not yet been forced 
below it. With structural arrears, the definition refers to a situation where household has 
frequent payment delinquencies that necessarily have not yet resulted in payment defaults. 
(Davydoff et al. 2008, 55.) The suggestion of Davydoff et al. (2008) will be utilized also in 
the empirical study conducted in the chapter 5. 
 
2.2 Consequences of over-indebtedness 
 
Over-indebtedness is an economic and social problem that has severe impacts on the stability 
of the society. Over-indebtedness has an adverse impact on the welfare of individuals and 
forces them to lower their standard of living. Over-indebtedness also poses individuals to risk 
of poverty and social exclusion. Borrowers’ over-indebtedness increases the risk of credit 
defaults and jeopardizes the financial stability of lenders and at extreme situations, the 
stability of the whole financial sector. Understanding the severity of over-indebtedness and its 
determinants is vital in order to adjust policy measures accordingly. 
 
2.2.1 Consequences for individuals  
 
Over-indebtedness leads to payment defaults that restrict consumers’ access to credit markets 
and decreases the ability to smooth consumption with income volatility. Over-indebted 
consumers are forced to lower their standard of living and often the financial situation does 
not recover even after income increases because they need to first pay back the outstanding 
debt. (Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. 2017, 194–196; Gerlach-Kristen & Lyons 2017, 2.) Financial 
service providers base their decisions to grant credit on information given by the borrower 
and credit history records. Credit records showing arrears are an indication of a lowered 
creditworthiness to lenders due to which over-indebted individuals face exclusion from credit. 
Commercial banks have little to no incentives to serve individuals with recorded arrears and 
they need to rely on credit from alternative financial providers. Alternative credit usually 
comes with high interest rates and charges, limited amounts of credit as well as short 
repayment periods. These disadvantageous conditions often increase the number of credit 
contracts needed and lead to a vicious cycle of repaying outstanding debt with new debt. 
Over-indebtedness is particularly concerning as the impact of it is disproportionate among the 
weakest individuals in economic and social terms and may result in complete financial 
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exclusion. Over-indebted individuals may even exclude themselves from financial services 
due to negative past experiences and fear of losing control. (Anderloni & Vandone 2011, 3–
4.) Over-indebtedness also impacts making other types of contracts such as hire purchase 
contracts, tenancy agreements or even employment contracts at some cases. Over-indebted 
individuals are forced to prepay commitments in order to make contracts of basic needs such 
as mobile subscription or insurance with the little current resources they have. Recorded 
arrears make it difficult to move into even a cheaper rental apartment and might make 
individuals dependent on social support. All these effects all deepen the risk of social 
exclusion and poverty.  
 
Over-indebtedness has an adverse impact on individual’s psychic well-being. Over-
indebtedness has adverse psychological impacts and lowers the self-esteem of individual 
(Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. 2017, 194–196). Studies show that over-indebtedness can lead to 
severe distress that may have also physical implications when over-indebtedness is a long-
term situation. Brown et al. (2005, 656–659) show that household heads of over-indebted 
households report significantly increased levels of distress and lower levels of psychological 
well-being than those without debt. The impact is mainly caused by having unsecured credit 
since household heads with only mortgage report average levels of distress. Other studies also 
confirm that the impact of debt on health is due to subjective judgment of debt burden and not 
by the objective level of debt per se. The objective level of debt correlates with factors that 
indicate better socioeconomic status, such as higher wealth levels. Households also have 
different optimal levels of debt during the lifecycle, which may explain the results. (Selenco 
& Batinic 2011, 1728–1729; Sweet et al. 2013, 98.)  
 
Long-term indebtedness impacts also physical health. Blomgren et al. (2014) study Finnish 
individuals that had been under foreclosure for at least 15 years until 2010 and find that risk 
of severe health problems including diabetes, coronary diseases and pulmonary diseases is 
increased among long-term over-indebted individuals in comparison to their control groups. 
They also find that the impact of over-indebtedness on health is stronger among women than 
men. They suggest that the impact is due to individual’s distress of debt burned, their reduced 
disposable income due to foreclosure, which causes health-damaging behavior. 
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2.2.2 Consequences for the financial sector and the society 
 
Over-indebtedness may lead to repayment delinquencies especially in economic downturn 
when over-indebted individuals are no longer able to meet their liabilities. Due to adverse 
economic shocks the number of arrears may increase sharply and increasing number of 
defaults on loans may even endanger the solvency of lenders and cause loss of reputation and 
diminish the trust in the financial sector. (Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. 2017, 194–196; Serrano-
Cinca et al. 2014, 3801–3802, 3809.) Studies show that failed banks are associated with fast 
credit growth before a financial shock and a sharp decline straight after it as the economic 
downturn increases the delinquencies in repayments (Serrano-Cinca et al. 2014, 3801). Risk 
of default can become contagious and affect also other banks and the stability of financial 
system (Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. 2017, 191). 
 
The level of outstanding debt to disposable income expanded effectively in all EU countries 
during few years before the last financial crisis. Household credit growth coincided with 
decreasing of financial difficulties and arrears due to economic expansion and easier access to 
credit. The proportion of households having difficulties making ends meet declined especially 
in those countries with the fastest growth of indebtedness. Statistics show that fast credit 
growth before the crisis contributed to the extent a country was impacted by the crisis: the 
countries that were impacted first and hardest by the crisis were also the ones the level of 
household indebtedness was highest before the crisis. In Finland however, credit growth was 
at mediocre level (19 %-points from 2004 to 2007) yet arrears declined only marginally and 
no impact on making ends meet could be perceived. The relation of indebtedness and 
financial difficulties is thus not straightforward, since even if consumption smoothing eases 
with credit availability, serving outstanding credit increases significantly household’s 
expenses it must cover with income. As the financial crisis hit, households had accumulated 
significant levels of debt and due to the slowdown in the growth of real income, the increased 
costs of servicing the accumulated debt and the cutting of credit, financial difficulties 
increased significantly. (Fondeville et al. 2010, 18–23.)  
 
Extensive household over-indebtedness may trigger economic crises and pose a risk for the 
whole society, since over-indebted households are particularly vulnerable to adverse 
economic shocks. Major proportion of their disposable income is bound by debt servicing and 
repayment costs, hindering their capability to prepare for income fluctuations. The number 
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and value of payment defaults begins to increase with economic downturn, leading to 
growing credit losses and increasing default risk for lenders. Over-indebtedness worsens the 
impact of negative income shock on aggregated demand, as households are not able to finance 
consumption with lending due to their payment defaults. The demand shock leads to profit 
losses and increasing rate of bankruptcies and business loan defaults that are vital for the 
economic stability. Even though the financial sector could bare the credit losses on household 
sector loans, the impact of the demand shock extends the impact on broader to the economy. 
(Nykänen 2018.) Even after income has increased to its original, it takes time before the 
consumption to recovers from the crisis since households have to first repay their arrears 
(Gerlach-Kristen & Lyons 2017, 2). 
 
According to Bank of Finland, excessive indebtedness can pose even a systemic risk to the 
financial sector. Over-indebted households typically have consumer credit in addition to 
mortgage and while major part of consumer credit is collateralized and granted by banks, non-
banks that are not under the supervision of authorities grant a significant and increasing 
proportion of consumer credit. These lenders include small-loan companies and peer-to-peer 
lending and their business models are potentially not adequately risk tested against adverse 
financial shocks. The credit granted by these companies is associated with high APRs 
(annualized percentage rate) and higher than average default rates as it is typically granted to 
individuals assessed uncreditworthy by banks. These types of consumer loans pose a social 
risk to the society due to they are associated with triggering debt cycling and arrears and 
leading to severe financial difficulties. Even if consumer credit granted by these companies 
does not yet pose a systemic risk, the evolvement of the sector needs to be closely followed. 
(Koskinen & Tuomikoski 2017.) 
 
Over-indebtedness increases poverty in society, especially since households with the lowest 
levels of income are the most vulnerable to its consequences. Over-indebted households are 
able to consume a significantly smaller proportion of their income than non-indebted 
households, due to high debt servicing costs. Over-indebtedness is an important factor 
causing and sustaining poverty in society, especially among low-income households, elderly 
households and households that have only one adult provider. (Betti et al. 2007, 154; 
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. 2017, 197.)  
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2.3 Over-indebtedness in Finland 
 
Household indebtedness has been increasing in Finland since late 1990’s and is currently 
above the EU average. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) also raised a concern 
regarding the risks of the growing indebtedness among Finnish households. During the past 
two decades the debt to disposable income ratio of Finnish households has increased from 
60 % to almost 130 %.  Meanwhile growth rate of indebtedness persisted through the 
recession followed by the last financial crisis, household disposable income and savings rate 
have been declining. In 2016 the savings rate turned negative and was even further 
diminished in 2017 and the growing spread between debt to disposable income and savings to 
income of Finnish households raises concern about the financial stability of Finnish society. 
Debt is particularly unevenly distributed in Finland as 10 % of all households borne 50 % of 
all debt granted by financial institutions. They account for one fifth of all indebted households 
and have debt over three times their annual disposable income and are especially vulnerable 
to any adverse shocks. Household indebtedness has historically been a major trigger of 
economic crises due to it increases households’ vulnerability to adverse economic shocks. 
Household over-indebtedness increases the vulnerability of the whole society and the extent 
the economy is impacted by adverse shocks. Mortgage forms major part of household debt, 
which makes households’ financial stability also dependent on residential real-estate market 
developments. Mortgage is typically granted with variable interest, which exposes households 
to interest rate risk. Particularly as interest levels begin to increase after a long period of low 
interests, households without saving may find themselves in financial difficulties. (Bank of 
Finland 2017; OSF 2018c; ESRB 2016.) The ESRB also warned that the Finnish banking 
sector is very concentrated and large compared to the size of the economy, has large mortgage 
portfolios the risk weights of which are lower than on average in Europe and heavily reliable 
on market funding. Due to the interlinked structure of the Nordic-Baltic financial sector, the 
ESRB raised also a concern of the contagious effect across the region if the risks of household 
indebtedness were to be realized. (ESRB 2017, 44; ESRB 2016.)  
 
The stock of consumer credit grew 5.7 % in 2017, and the growth rate of unsecured credit was 
particularly high at 10.9 %. Credit institutions operating in Finland grant 80 % of all 
consumer credit. The remaining 20 % of the stock is for most part granted by other financial 
institutions and foreign credit institutions. Small-loan companies and peer-to-peer lending 
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account for a small proportion of the whole stock. (Bank of Finland 2018.) Even though 
mortgage and secured consumer credit form the largest part of total household debt stock, 
unsecured credit is the riskiest debt type that triggers household over-indebtedness. Instant 
loans are major triggers for over-indebtedness as they often are taken with little consideration 
and in situations that are already financially difficult. After regulatory attempts to restrict the 
interest rate of small loans (under 2,000 euros) and marketing of instant loans, new forms of 
loans have been introduced to the markets. These loans include limit loans and loans to 
aggregate the existing small loans into one larger loan, to which the interest restrictions do not 
apply. Aggregated loans have typically tempting conditions as the monthly installments, 
interest and costs are typically smaller than of all the commitments that debtor has combined. 
The repayment periods however are long, and the debt burdens increase to substantial levels 
and only prolong debt problems. Marketing of limit and aggregated loans is targeted to 
debtors that already have multiple commitments that they are unable to handle. 
 
Payment defaults in Finland are piled up to same individuals that on average have 15 
registered payment defaults. Suomen Asiakastieto Oy registered almost 1.3 million new 
payment default entries by the third quarter of 2018. Payment defaults were registered for 
7,500 new persons compared to Q3/2017 and the total number of people with payment 
defaults was record-high, over 380 thousand, in Q3/2018. (Asiakastieto 2018.) Yearly half a 
million persons (including juridical persons) have payments under debt enforcement. Debt 
enforcement was terminated during the year 2017 considering 55 % of these people. They 
were either able to repay their debt, the debt was expired, or they were declared to have no 
garnishable income or distrainable assets. Payments under debt enforcement include also fees 
under public law that do not result in registered payment default if they are repaid within 1.5 
years debt enforcement has begun. The total number of individuals under debt enforcement 
and the amount of outstanding debt has been increasing for years and is currently record high. 
(OSF 2018b.)  
 
Over-indebtedness is a topical subject also in Finland and noteworthy studies have already 
been conducted of Finnish households’ over-indebtedness. Rantala and Tarkkala (2009) have 
conducted an extensive research of debt problems at the turning point of the economic upturn 
and financial crisis. More recent research is presented by Raijas, Lehtinen and Leskinen 
(2010) and Oksanen, Aaltonen and Rantala (2015). Raijas et al. (2010) study the determinants 
of over-indebtedness utilizing Finnish studies and statistics on the field. Oksanen et al. (2014) 
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contribute to the Finnish research by conducting an extensive study of over-indebtedness 
based on administrative information of debt enforcement. Hyytinen and Putkuri (2018) 
contribute to the behavioral research of over-indebtedness by studying the impact of optimism 
on over-borrowing with Finnish household data. They perform unique analysis of household’s 
borrowing behavior and the forecasting errors they make and find novel results on the linkage 
of optimistic forecasting errors and accumulating excessive levels of debt.  
 
Finland, as a Nordic welfare state, is considered to take care of the basic necessities of its 
citizens, such as healthcare and basic livelihood (Oksanen et al. 2015, 232). Oksanen, 
Aaltonen & Rantala (2015, 232) hypothesize in their study of debt problems in Finland that 
the security provided by the welfare state diminishes the impact of socio-economic factors on 
the risk of debt problems, while individual characteristics and lifestyle as well as behavior 
regarding economic decisions has more role in explaining debt issues. Agreeing with Oksanen 
et al. (2015), this provides an interesting aspect for studying the determinants of over-
indebtedness among Finnish households. 
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3 OVER-INDEBTEDNESS IN THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
The following chapter focuses on the theoretical framework of over-indebtedness. The 
chapter is divided into four parts. The section 3.1 presents the traditional economic approach 
to indebtedness: the lifecycle hypothesis of consumption and saving. The section describes 
households’ consumption-saving decisions and discusses the nature of indebtedness explained 
by the model. Reasons for over-indebtedness that are in line with the traditional theory are 
also discussed. The section 3.2 presents theoretical behavioral research that attempt to explain 
households’ perceived consumption-saving decisions that contradict with the traditional 
rational expectations model. The section presents the relevant behavioral drivers of over-
indebtedness that are due to biases within individual’s decision-making process. The third 
section 3.3 then presents the ability to pay and negative equity theories that explain 
households’ decisions to default on their commitments. 
 
3.1 Traditional economic theory  
 
Indebtedness in traditional economic theory is explained with household consumption 
smoothing over the lifecycle. The lifecycle permanent income hypothesis1 (LC-PI) states that 
households’ current consumption is not dependent on their current income, instead they 
consume based on their lifecycle resources that are distributed evenly throughout the 
lifecycle. Rational consumers are assumed to be able to solve the optimal level of 
consumption that is a constant fraction the consumption opportunities that can be financed 
with the lifecycle resources. Households redistribute their resources over the lifecycle and 
smooth the impact of income fluctuations on consumption by borrowing and saving. 
Indebtedness is thus an optimal and rational decision for young households in particular, since 
their level of income is lower than the lifecycle permanent level. While current income 
exceeds the lifecycle permanent level, households save the excess income for retirement when 
again the level of income decreases. The level of consumption is thus assumed not to vary 
with the level of current income, instead to remain constant during different parts of the 
lifecycle. (Disney et al. 2008, 6; Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. 2017, 189; Hall 1988, 971.)  
                                                
1 The lifecycle permanent income hypothesis is based on the theoretical findings of Friedman (1957) 
and Modigliani (1966) 
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The theory assumes that rational consumers are able to “solve” the optimal level of 
consumption that can be financed with the lifecycle resources. Households’ utility 
maximization over the lifecycle is based on intertemporal allocation of resources between 
current and future periods. Based on Deaton (1992), Betti et al. (2007, 138) present the 
optimal level of consumption in period ! as a constant fraction !:  
 
(1)  !! ! ! ! !!!! ! !!!!!!! !!!!!!! ! !!!.  
 
The right side of the equation presents the lifecycle resources:  !! is the period ! income, ! the 
real interest rate and !! is household’s assets on period ! that can be positive or negative. The 
equation (1) states that the constant optimal level of consumption is financed with current 
income and either with wealth or by borrowing when current resources fall short of lifecycle 
permanent level. (Betti et al. 2007, 138.)  
 
In the generalization of the LCH, consumers are able to optimize their level of lifecycle 
consumption based on their rational expectations of future resources and thus their future 
assets and liabilities remain balanced during the lifecycle and over-indebtedness should not 
occur. The generalization however does not acknowledge the impact of uncertainty related to 
predicting future income or wealth development. Households may face unpredictable adverse 
events that are not in their control, such as external macroeconomic shocks that trigger 
unemployment or unexpected changes in one’s health that may cause incapacity for work. 
The uncertainty related to predicting future income is in fact the only factor explaining over-
indebtedness that is in accordance with the LCH, since the theory assumes that excluding 
unexpected events, rational consumers are able to estimate their lifecycle resources and adjust 
current consumption to it. Betti et al. (2007) present the impact of uncertainty following Hall 
(1978) that presents a commonly referred approach to incorporating uncertainty into the LCH. 
In the model future income is assumed to be stochastic, i.e. the changes of it to be completely 
random. Betti et al. (2007, 139) state that as consumers choose the optimal level of 
consumption with all available information, the change of optimal consumption under 
uncertainty can be presented:  
 
(2)  !! !!!! ! !! ! !!!! ! !! ! !!!!,  
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where !!!! utility in period ! ! !. The presentation is known as the Martingale Hypothesis 
and states that the expected change in consumption from period ! to period ! ! ! is zero (i.e. 
the expected consumption of period ! ! ! is the consumption level of period !). When 
incorporating uncertainty in the model, consumers are no longer able to “solve” the optimal 
consumption level and the optimal level of consumption can thus change with new 
information, differentiating from the assumption of constant consumption of the general LCH. 
According to the Martingale Hypothesis, consumers use all available information in 
estimating lifecycle income and all expected information including (expected) changes in 
future income, should already be incorporated into the optimal level of consumption. The 
general stochastic presentation states that the optimal level of consumption changes only due 
to unexpected information and that the changes of it are random. The unpredictability of 
random changes causes over-indebtedness when the optimal level of consumption decreases 
drastically due to unexpected shocks, meanwhile the consumer has borrowed based on former 
estimation of the optimal consumption. Such unpredictable changes that are out of control of 
the individual are mainly adverse macroeconomic shocks that impact households’ income (or 
expenses). Macroeconomic shocks affect inevitably a proportion of households, implying that 
over-indebtedness is a phenomenon that is out of consumers control when estimating the 
optimal consumption. As long as consumers are assumed to have rational expectations, 
households that are not impacted by adverse macroeconomic shocks should never become 
over-indebted. Rational households base their consumption and borrowing decisions on all 
available information about their future resources and their assets and liabilities should 
remain balanced if no adverse and unexpected external shocks occur. (Betti et al. 2007, 139–
141.) 
 
3.2 Behavioral theory 
 
Traditional economic theory faces criticism since it assumes consumers are able to solve 
complex optimization problems under uncertainty, or at least act as if they were able to 
optimize a constant consumption level for the lifecycle, but also due to empirical evidence 
shows a strong correlation between current period income and consumption. Behavioral 
economics has gained more ground on the field by providing plausible explanations for over-
indebtedness, beyond the uncertainty of estimating future income. Behavioral economic 
theories are based on an assumption that individuals have bounded rationality, i.e. they do not 
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behave as expected by the traditional theory of rational expectations due to their decision-
making is restricted by behavioral biases. According to behavioral theories households to fail 
to adjust their current consumption to their lifecycle resources because of behavioral biases 
and instead end up consuming more than the optimal level. Behavioral theories also suggest 
that in addition to their incapability to solve the optimal level of consumption, consumers fail 
to follow their consumption or saving plans due to lack of self-control. Over-consumption 
leads to excessive indebtedness when the current level of income cannot cover the 
consumption and spending needs to be financed with debt. And while current income could 
cover the desired level of consumption, over-consumption leads to unsustainably low savings 
rates. (Betti at al. 2007, 141; Ottaviani & Vandone 2011, 755; Thaler & Benartzi 2004, 165.) 
The following section will present factors presented by behavioral theories that impact 
individual’s decision-making processes and lead to holding unsustainable levels of debt 
compared to resources.  
 
Behavioral economics assume that consumers have inconsistent time preferences and are 
present biased, which can explain the perceived correlation of current income and 
consumption. Inconsistent time preferences and myopia (i.e. strongly preferring current 
period utility at the cost of future benefits) impact the allocation of resources for current and 
future periods and may lead to over-consumption and over-indebtedness. The traditional 
theory of rational expectations assumes that consumers choose the optimal consumption level 
by optimizing the lifecycle level with an exponential discounting model, where future costs 
and benefits are discounted with the real interest rate. Behavioral economics model the impact 
of present bias with hyperbolic discounting that applies an additional factor for discounting 
future costs and benefits. O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) present the impact of present bias, 
utilizing the model developed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and used by also Laibson (1997). 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001, 126) present consumer’s intertemporal preferences at period ! 
with utility function: 
 
(3)  !! !! !!!!!!! !!! ! !!!! ! ! !!!!!!!!!! ,  
  
where !! presents the utility received at period !, ! is the discount factor ! ! !!!!!!! , where ! 
is the discount rate and ! presents consumer’s time-inconsistent preference for immediate 
satisfaction. Current utility is weighted with !!, while the weight for future utility is !!!. If ! ! ! the equation (3) corresponds to the exponential discounting model, according to which 
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time-consistent consumers value their utility based on theories of rational expectations. Time-
consistency in preferences indicates that consumer prefers to have the same level of utility in 
all periods and does not prefer the utility or well-being in one period over the others. When ! ! !, consumers are present biased and prefer current period utility at the cost of future 
utility, which is more heavily discounted than it would be with the exponential discounting 
model. Time-inconsistency leads to consuming too much in all periods, since also as the next 
period ! ! ! comes, the current utility !!!!, is strongly preferred at the cost of future utility. 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001, 125–126.)  
 
Behavioral theories acknowledge that consumers can be aware of their myopic preferences 
and attempt to restrict their consumption with financial planning. Behavioral findings argue 
that even if consumers are capable of performing financial planning, they fail to follow any 
pre-defined plan due to lack of self-control. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) illustrate the issues 
with self-control on their Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis with a dual preference set 
consisting of planner and doer preferences. There is an internal conflict between the two sets 
of preferences: the planner attempts to maximize the lifecycle utility that consists of doer sub-
utilities, while the doer would maximize its (short-run) utility by consuming all resources on 
current period. The planner will need to exert willpower to restrict the myopic behavior of the 
doer, which causes psychic costs caused by resisting the temptation of having immediate 
benefits and gratification. By having to exert willpower, the short run utility diminishes more 
that is caused by the reduction in consumption, and the more the consumption needs to be 
restricted, the higher are the costs of the willpower effort. (Shefrin & Thaler 1988, 611–612, 
615.) 
 
As presented by Shefrin and Thaler (1988), consumers are assumed to be able to restrict their 
myopic behavior by exerting willpower, the impact of which is however dependent on how 
aware consumers are of their self-control problems. Present biased consumers are typically in 
behavioral theories divided into naïve and sophisticated individuals, the former of which are 
unable to realize their inconsistent time-preferences or foresee their self-control problems, 
while the latter are aware of them and attempt to restrict their behavior by exerting willpower. 
(Thaler & Benartzi 2004, 167–168.) O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) present a model of partial 
naïveté to illustrate the behavior of individuals with different levels of self-control problems. 
They define ! as consumer’s own belief of their present bias. Consumers behave as modeled 
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by equation (3) and are divided into four groups depending on the relation of their beliefs and 
their actual present bias !: 
 ! ! ! ! !! ! ! ! !! ! ! ! !! ! ! ! ! 
 
Time-consistent consumers behave as assumed by the traditional theories of rational 
expectations. By setting ! ! !  in the equation (3), it corresponds to the exponential 
discounting model. Sophisticated present biased consumers use hyperbolic discounting  
(! ! !) instead, but are completely aware of their self-control problems (! ! !). Naïve 
consumers on the contrary are unaware of their self-control problems and believe they are 
acting as time-consistent consumers !! ! !! , but are actually present-biased !! ! ! ). 
Partially naïve consumers on the other hand acknowledge their self-control problems !! ! !! 
but underestimate the magnitude !! ! !!  and instead believe that they are acting as 
sophisticated individuals. Previous literature on self-control problems typically has divided 
present biased into only two groups, sophisticated and naïve. O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) 
argue that replacing the setting with partial naiveté, models the self-control problems more 
accurately, since any degree of naïveté results in different choices than complete 
sophistication. (O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001, 127, 130.) 
 
Naïveté increases the risk of over-indebting, since being unaware of their self-control 
problems naïve, or partially naïve, individuals rush into having immediate gratification. The 
lack of self-control leads to over-consumption that can be financed with debt, since the future 
costs of over-consumption and irresponsible borrowing are heavily discounted and neglected 
when making current period consumption decisions. Naïve individuals tend to be optimistic 
and prone to procrastinating with activities that have immediate costs, such as paying more 
than the minimum amount due on the credit card. Procrastinating with debt repayment 
accelerates the accumulation of debt and increases their risk of over-indebtedness. Completely 
sophisticated individuals on the contrary would be aware of that they would face self-control 
problems in the future if they further procrastinate any immediate costs. Sophistication (or 
small degree of naïveté) alleviates the problem and reduces the risk of accumulating excessive 
debt due to procrastinating the repayment of it. However, even sophistication does not guard 
Time-consistent 
Sophisticated 
Naïve 
Partially naïve   
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present biased consumers from over-consumption altogether. Sophisticated individuals are 
able to foresee facing self-control problems in the future and choose the immediate benefits 
instead of having to exert willpower on the inevitable. Even completely sophisticated 
individuals may thus end up over-consuming and financing it with borrowing, despite of 
being more conscientious with the repayment of debt. (O’Donoghue & Rabin 1999, 119–
120.) Myopic consumers can assess that their level of debt is excessive, but still end up over-
consuming or taking irrational risks due to their lack of self-control. Behavioral findings 
suggest that present biased consumers discount future costs heavier than future earnings, 
which further hinders their ability to estimate their future utility correctly. (Ottaviani & 
Vandone 2011, 755; Kilborn 2005, 21.) Controlling myopic preferences with only willpower 
seems not effective enough in the light of these theoretical results. Alternative solutions for 
controlling myopic behavior include external pre-commitment tools, in which a contribution 
is deducted straight from income or consumer sets an automatic transfer to a savings plan 
straight away after receiving earnings. With a restrictive enough external pre-committed 
saving tool, consumer can choose the maximum feasible consumption without having to exert 
any willpower. In practice pre-defined plans may not be exhaustive enough as consumers 
have to have a buffer available against unexpected and urgent expenses, instead of leaving 
only the minimum amount required for regular expenses. Psychologists have found effect in 
self-enforced mental rules in restricting consumption to sustainable levels without having to 
rely on self-control. These mental rules need however to be simple and stable enough and 
they neither are effective when it comes to naïve individuals that are unaware of their time-
inconsistent preferences. (Shefrin & Thaler 1988, 613–615.)  
 
Behavioral economics has identified several other biases that restrict responsible financial 
decision-making. People have a tendency to develop heuristics, i.e. mental shortcuts to 
alleviate the challenge of probability estimation. People tend to consistently miscalculate 
probabilities, especially related to adverse events. Mental shortcut used in probability 
estimation is called the availability heuristics that implies that probabilities are estimated 
based on how easily a similar event can be recalled. Risk estimations tend to be based on the 
availability, or in other words, the frequency, recentness and importance, of a similar event. 
The more available a similar event is, or the easier it is to recall, the more the probability of 
the event is overestimated, and vice versa the harder it is to recall an (adverse) event, the more 
the probability is underestimated. Failing to estimate probabilities correctly has an impact on 
borrowing decisions and increases the probability of household ending up with an 
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unsustainable level of debt. Over-indebtedness lacks availability if household has not 
experienced liquidity crisis or other financial difficulties frequently or recently. (Kilborn 
2005, 13, 19–20.) 
 
Awareness of default rates or bankruptcy statistic hardly impacts consumers’ estimation of 
their own probability of over-indebtedness. Psychological studies show that even if 
individuals knew the statistical probability of an adverse event, they tend to underestimate 
their own predisposition to the risk. Behavioral studies claim that the overconfidence bias as it 
is referred as, is actually present in most of people. Overconfidence bias impacts over-
indebtedness due to people tend to underestimate their own risk of adverse events that could 
lead to financial difficulties, and instead end up borrowing excessively. The impact of 
overconfidence bias is further worsened by individuals’ illusion of control that makes them 
believe they are able to diminish their risk by controlling their behavior. Overconfidence bias 
impacts the risk of over-indebtedness especially when the economic situation is expected to 
improve. Expectations of a better economic situation encourage households to borrow to 
reach a higher level of consumption that they are expecting to reach eventually as the 
economic situation improves. Households tend to overestimate the probability of higher 
future earnings and underestimate the probability of facing any adverse shocks and may end 
up borrowing excessively. (Kilborn 2005, 18–19.) 
 
Due to their bounded rationality, individuals fail to choose the optimal savings rate to 
maximize lifetime utility and instead prefer current benefits, even with unreasonably high 
future costs. Individuals also tend to underestimate their probability of adverse shocks, 
leading them to irrational risk-taking. According to behavioral theories, unsustainable levels 
of debt can be explained with irrationalities within individual’s decision-making process and 
irrational risk-taking. Over-indebtedness is triggered by the combination of excessive debt 
and adverse economic shocks. (Anderloni & Vandone 2011, 2; Kilborn 2005, 17–18.)   
 
3.3 The ability-to-pay and negative equity theories  
 
The following section will focus on the theoretical presentation of debt repayment problems. 
There are two theories, namely the negative equity theory and the ability-to-pay theory, which 
explain the decision-making leading to arrears and payment defaults. The negative equity 
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theory presents arrears as a strategic decision that is made rationally comparing the costs and 
benefits of repaying debt. The decision to firstly fall into arrears, and eventually default on 
loans, is triggered by household’s negative equity that is caused by for example housing price 
decline and a high loan-to-value ratio. Strategic arrears or payment defaults are possible only 
with non-recourse loans that can be collected or distraint only to the value of collateral. The 
negative equity theories are assumed to be relevant in countries such as the USA, where non-
recourse loans exist in the legislation and particularly in explaining mortgage defaults. The 
ability-to-pay theory explains arrears as a consequence of affordability problems that are due 
to mainly adverse shocks to income or expenses. The decision to fall into arrears is not a 
strategic choice and households attempt to avoid arrears and having to default on 
commitments to the last. Arrears are triggered only when household’s resources become 
inadequate to cover their regular commitments and household is facing liquidity constrains, 
i.e. is not able to borrow more or realize accumulated wealth to cover the income decline. The 
ability-to-pay theory is assumed to be more accurate in explaining debt repayment issues in 
full-recourse countries such as the European countries analyzed in this study. The borrowers 
are less sensitive to negative equity since the whole amount of full-recourse loans, including 
interest and costs, can be garnished from debtor’s current and future income and distrained to 
the value of all debtor’s assets. Since in full-recourse environment, defaulting is rather a 
consequence of an adverse income shock than an intended strategic choice, household’s 
probability of falling into arrears is determined by its financial vulnerability to adverse 
shocks. The larger the share of debt servicing to income, the more vulnerable the household is 
to negative shocks to income. (Kukk 2016, 5–7; Gerlach-Kristen & Lyons 2017, 3–4; 
Aristei & Gallo 2016, 454.)  
 
Arrears are a signal to creditors of debtor’s lowered creditworthiness and increased risk of 
defaulting. Arrears are a predictive sign of more severe financial difficulties and often used in 
the literature as an indicator of the risk of over-indebtedness. Falling into arrears can be 
presented with a decision-tree following Gerlach-Kristen and Lyons (2017). The left of the 
decision-tree presents the negative equity theory and the right side the ability-to-pay theory 
and it indicates three possible paths to arrears. 
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Figure 1: Decision tree of arrears 
 
According to the negative equity theory, households can fall into arrears even if they are not 
facing any severe affordability issues. Negative equity, caused by for example housing price 
decline, in non-recourse environment is an incentive to fall into strategic arrears and 
eventually default on loans, typically mortgage. If the outstanding value of debt significantly 
exceeds the value of the collateral, household may be better of defaulting instead of repaying 
the debt. In full-recourse environment household does not benefit from strategic arrears, as 
the loan needs to be fully repaid despite the value of the collateral has decreased. If the 
household is not facing affordability issues, it is not optimal to fall into arrears and the 
household needs to repay the loan at full value. According to the ability-to-pay theory, falling 
into arrears has different paths depending on the expected duration of financial difficulties. If 
household expects its financial situation to improve after short-term affordability issues, 
falling into temporary arrears can be optimal in comparison to downsizing and lowering the 
standard of living. In such situation household expects that it is able to repay the arrears when 
the financial situation improves and does not necessarily have to default completely. When 
facing long-term affordability issues, the decision depends on household’s equity. If 
household has positive equity, it is forced to downsize to repay commitments but as 
downsizing might not be an option for households constrained by negative equity, they are 
forced to default and fall into long-term arrears. This situation is referred as dual-trigger 
arrears, because it is caused by the combination of affordability issues and negative equity. 
The economic and social implications of long-term arrears caused by the dual-trigger are 
substantial in comparison to the implications of short-term arrears. Policy measures to prevent 
the dual-trigger situation have been in the center of attention since the last financial crisis that 
caused a significant increase in mortgage default and foreclosure rates. (Gerlach-Kristen & 
Lyons 2017, 11–12, 19.)  
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4 LITERARY SURVEY ON THE CAUSES OF OVER-
INDEBTEDNESS  
 
 
The following chapter provides a literary survey on the empirical evidence of causes and 
determinants of household over-indebtedness. Literature identifies several household 
characteristics and circumstances that are associated with increased risk of over-indebtedness. 
Previous studies (see, for example, Berthoud & Kempson 1992, Herbert & Kempson 1995, 
Webley & Nyhus 2001, Betti et al. 2007) have identified several risk factors that increase the 
risk of over-indebtedness. Risk factors include (1) young age, (2) low income, (3) 
unemployment, (4) having dependent children and (5) having only one adult provider, (6) 
being divorced or separated, (7) living in rented accommodation, (8) having multiple credit 
commitments, (9) facing unexpected income shocks and (10) having a neglectful attitude 
towards paying commitments. The impact of these risk factors on household’s economic 
stability is rather cumulative than immediate and the risk tends to increase with the number of 
risk factors household fulfills. Households that fulfill multiple risk factors are not capable of 
preparing for adverse economic shocks and are vulnerable to income fluctuations. (Disney et 
al. 2008, 4; Kempson et al. 2004, 29–32.) Kempson et al. (2004, 29) find that the exposure to 
the risk of over-indebtedness of households fulfilling four or more of the risk factors is 
significantly increased. Survey conducted by Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2017) suggests that 
explanations for over-indebtedness given by over-indebted individuals and creditors tend to 
be different. Lenders and financial experts consider that over-indebtedness is to be blamed on 
irresponsible borrowing and debtors’ lack of financial literacy. Debtors themselves tend to 
blame external factors such as adverse economic shocks or the actions of lenders and ignore 
the impact of their own actions or illiteracy on their exposure to the risk. (Gutiérrez-Nieto et 
al. 2017, 188–190.) 
 
The following literature survey present these factors that predispose households to the risk of 
over-indebtedness and discusses the relation of these factors and the probability of facing 
external adverse events. The following literary survey is divided into three sections. The first 
section 4.1 presents identified socio-economic characteristics that impact household’s lifetime 
resources and increase their risk of long-term financial difficulties. The second section 4.2 
presents previous findings how households’ lack of financial literacy impact their risk of 
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over-indebtedness. The third section 4.3 then presents the impact of limited rationality in 
financial decision-making caused by behavioral biases. The section 4.4 presents findings on 
the impact of over commitment and adverse credit market policies.  
 
4.1 Household’s socio-economic characteristics 
 
Economic literature acknowledges that socio-economic circumstances and life events have a 
significant impact in predisposing households to debt repayment difficulties and arrears. The 
risk of persistent financial difficulties arises mainly from a lack of lifetime resources that are 
due to for example low level of education, unstable wage or uncertain employment prospects. 
Households at the highest risk of over-indebtedness suffer material deprivation and do not 
have savings to cover unexpected expenses or income fluctuation. (Gerlach-Kristen & Lyons 
2017, 3; Disney et al. 2008, 4–5; Kempson et al. 2004, 29.) Facing unexpected adverse shocks 
to income, expenses, health, family status or employment makes households unable to 
balance their resources and expenditure requirements and increases significantly their risk of 
over-indebtedness (Kukk 2016; Betti et al. 2007, 140). This section is divided into two sub-
sections, the first of which presents evidence related to the impact of low income and adverse 
income shocks and the second the other household and individual level characteristic 
associated with increased risk of over-indebtedness.  
 
4.1.1 Low income and adverse shocks 
 
Previous studies show that there is a clear relationship between over-indebtedness and low 
income. Studies show that the relation of low income and over-indebtedness remains 
significant even after controlling for other relevant household characteristics. (Davydoff et al. 
2008, 16.) The proportion of households that are over-indebted among those households that 
are indebted tends to decrease with the level of income, even though the debt levels tends to 
increase with the income level (Betti et al. 2008, 147–148.) Fondeville et al. (2010, 33) find 
that the proportion of over-indebted households is significantly increased among European 
low-income households that have disposable income below 60 % of the national median. 
They measure over-indebtedness with an objective measure that considers household over-
indebted based on the proportion of outstanding debt to disposable income. Outstanding debt 
refers to all debt that has become due for payment, including also debt that is due to be paid 
 33 
 
but not yet considered as arrears. (Fondeville et al. 2010, 27.) Fondeville et al. (2010, 27) 
consider it evident that households that have outstanding debt due to be paid exceeding their 
monthly disposable income, are facing severe difficulties in managing their finances. They 
find, based on the EU-SILC 2008 module of over-indebtedness, that approximately 7 % of 
low-income households have outstanding debt exceeding their monthly disposable income, 
while the proportion is 4.5 % among households with income level above the threshold. They 
find significant differences between countries: the widest spread was in Greece where 12.8 % 
of low-income households were considered over-indebted and only 3.4 % of higher income 
households. In Germany for example the relationship was the other way around and a larger 
proportion of higher income households had outstanding credit exceeding their disposable 
income than of low-income households. (Fondeville et al. 2010, 33.) Kempson and Atkinson 
(2006, 29) make a distinction between two groups in financial difficulties: over-indebted 
households and low-income households. According to their research of UK households, the 
over-indebted households had average income levels, while their level of mortgage and 
unsecured debt was excessive in comparison to their earnings. The other group in financial 
difficulties consisted mainly of households that belonged to the two lowest income quintiles 
and typically did not have mortgage and had only low levels of unsecured credit. However, 
the debt servicing to income ration of the households that had debt, was significantly high. 
(Kempson and Atkinson 2006, 18, 24–25) 
 
Betti et al. (2007) argue that the variation of indebtedness levels between income groups in 
different countries can be explained with the level of liberalization of consumer credit 
markets. They divide countries based on if the credit market policies are restricted or 
liberalized and argue that households in countries with liberalized consumer credit markets 
have a higher propensity to borrow and the differences in indebtedness levels between income 
groups are larger than in countries with restrictive credit market policies. Betti et al. (2007) 
claim that credit market liberalization has a significant impact on households’ consumption to 
income ratios and the U-shape of consumption to income predicted by the LCH can only be 
perceived in the European countries that have liberalized credit markets. They suggest that in 
countries that are considered to have restricted credit markets, households are not able to 
optimally smooth their lifetime consumption and it tends to decline with age. (Betti et al. 
2007, 147–151.) 
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The results of EU-SILC 2008 module of over-indebtedness show that income shocks have a 
significant impact on the risk of over-indebtedness, independent of household’s level of 
income as such. The results indicate that even households that have high original income 
levels are exposed to the risk of over-indebtedness when facing an adverse income shock. The 
results of the EU-SILC 2008 module show that in comparison to other households, over-
indebted households are significantly more likely to have faced a major income shock. Third 
of over-indebted households reported having faced a major income loss during last 12 
months, while the proportion was only 19 % among other households. The results indicate 
that households that have faced a significant adverse income shock are twice as likely to be 
over-indebted compared to households that have not faced any major income losses. Low-
income households are particularly vulnerable to adverse shocks. 41.3 % of over-indebted 
low-income households reported having faced an adverse income shock, while the proportion 
was 30.8 % among over-indebted households with income above the poverty threshold. In 
Finland the difference was less significant as 33.0 % of over-indebted low-income and 31.5 % 
of higher income households reported facing an adverse income shock. In some countries, for 
example Portugal, a significantly larger proportion of over-indebted households with income 
above the poverty threshold (68 %) had faced an income shock than of low-income 
households (16 %). Household with higher income level typically may have accumulated high 
level of debt that is no longer manageable after the income decline. The EU-SILC 2008 
special module data however reveals that adverse income shocks are not the only significant 
factor causing over-indebtedness, since majority of over-indebted households had not faced 
any income losses. (Fondeville et al. 2010, 42–46.)  
 
Disney et al. (2008, 30–31) also identify income shocks as an important factor causing 
financial difficulties. They identify unemployment, divorce or family dissolution and changes 
in health as possible causes of income shocks, all of which might have different impacts on 
the risk of over-indebtedness. Regarding unemployment, they hypothesize that unemployment 
may lead to over-indebtedness firstly because household is not no longer able to service debt 
that was taken while employed. Secondly, households that experience unemployment 
typically do not have adequate savings to cover the income losses caused by unemployment 
and may resort to consumer credit to make ends meet. If they are unable to find employment 
to restore their level of income, they might find themselves unable to repay the debt. (Disney 
et al. 2008, 30–31.) Disney et al. (2008, 55) find that arrears during unemployment are not 
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only driven by the income shock but instead the combination of income loss and having high 
credit commitments.  
 
Fondeville et al. (2010, 40–42) study the impact of unemployment to over-indebtedness with 
the EU-SILC 2008 module data by measuring employment status of a household with work 
intensity that varies from zero when all of the working-aged household members are 
unemployed to one when all of them are employed full-time. The EU wide results show rather 
small impact of employment intensity on over-indebtedness when income level is controlled. 
In some countries, Finland included, the relation of employment intensity and over-
indebtedness however is evident. Employment intensity decreases household’s risk of over-
indebtedness as 2.7 % of households in the lowest employment intensity group (0–0.19) were 
over-indebted, and only 0.8 % of the highest group (0.75–1). In some countries the 
relationship seemed to be the other way around or there was no clear relationship between 
over-indebtedness and employment intensity. Focusing only on the low-income group of 
households, Fondeville et al. (2010) show that the risk of over-indebtedness tends to in fact 
grow with the intensity of work. The tendency is probably due to the increased access to 
credit of those households that are in employment compared to unemployed ones. (Fondeville 
et al. 2010, 40–42.)  
 
4.1.2 Other household characteristics 
 
Young age is generally considered as a predictor of over-indebtedness. Davydoff et al. (2008) 
conduct a literary survey of the nature of over-indebtedness with European studies and argue 
that younger households are at above the average risk of financial difficulties irrespective of 
their other characteristics or circumstances. (Davydoff et al. 2008, 11.) Kempson et al. (2004) 
find similar results in their study of British households by showing that the rate of arrears is 
significantly higher among young households and that it decreases significantly among 
households aged 30 or older. Oksanen et al. (2014) also find in their study of Finnish 
households that younger households had more debt and the prevalence of debt problems was 
the most common among the youngest age group. 
 
The LCH model suggests that the level of indebtedness is expected to relate negatively on 
age, since younger households borrow more than older ones to smooth their lifetime 
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consumption. The expected income growth of younger households is higher, which 
rationalizes their negative asset positions. (Disney et al. 2008, 15.) Betti et al. (2007, 150) 
argue that since households are expected to borrow based on their expected lifetime resources, 
over-indebtedness among indebted households should not depend on age. In line with Betti et 
al. (2007), Fondeville et al. (2010, 34–35) find that the proportion of over-indebted 
households among indebted households is rather constant between different age groups. They 
study over-indebtedness with the EU-SILC 2008 special module data of over-indebtedness 
and measure over-indebtedness with an objective measure of excessive debt burden. They 
define that household has excessive debt burden if overall outstanding debt (debt that is due 
for payment) exceeds household’s monthly disposable income. They find that the variation of 
excessive debt burden is rather small between different age groups, with the exception of 
households over 65 that have considerably lower debt burdens. Age thus affects household’s 
probability of being indebted, but not directly the probability that an indebted household 
becomes over-indebted. Disney et al. (2008, 15) even argue that due to expected income 
growth opportunities, the same level of excessive debt burden is more severe among older 
households than younger ones.  
 
Previous studies (see, for example Disney et al. 2008; Betti et al. 2007; Kempson et al. 2004; 
Fondeville et al. 2010, Davydoff et al. 2008) show that having children increases household’s 
risk of over-indebtedness. Having children increases household expenses and makes a large 
proportion of them fixed. Having children also tends to impact household’s disposable 
income, as especially mothers may choose to stay home with children or to work only part-
time. With a large proportion of expenses being fixed, households have little room to adjust 
expenses to income fluctuations making them vulnerable for adverse economic shocks. 
(Fondeville et al. 2010, 35–36.) 
 
Single parents with dependent children have a significantly higher probability of financial 
difficulties than two-parent families. Betti et al. (2007, 153) show that lone parents with at 
least one dependent child under the age of 16 are especially exposed to the risk of over-
indebtedness. The EU-SILC 2008 module reveals that almost 10 % of single parent 
households were over-indebted, which is twice the proportion than among other types of 
households (Fondeville et al. 2010, 37). Davydoff et al. (2008, 13–14) argue that the risk is 
the higher the younger is the youngest child in the household. They however note that the 
impact of lone parent should be interpreted carefully since the increased risk of a lone parent 
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is mainly due the fixed expenses caused by having dependent children and the number of 
adults has less of an effect. The study of Kempson et al. (2004) of British households 
complements the argument and shows that lone parents are typically young, have low income 
and have faced a significant income drop due to relationship breakdown, which all impact 
their higher risk of financial difficulties. 
 
Even though studies show similar results of the impact of dependent children on over-
indebtedness practically across all European countries, there are differences whether the 
number of children impacts the risk. Kempson et al. (2004) show that in Britain, the number 
of dependent children increases household’s risk of arrears. The EU-SILC 2008 module 
results show that in some countries the risk of over-indebtedness decreases if the number of 
children increases to three or more. Households with many children tend to have lower levels 
of disposable income than households with fewer children, but studies show that the impact of 
dependent children is actually independent of households’ income levels. Large low-income 
households are necessarily not more vulnerable to over-indebtedness than large higher income 
households. The EU-SILC 2008 module reveals that for example in Spain and Slovenia, large 
low-income households have actually a lower risk of over-indebtedness that small low-
income households. The size of the family seems to increase the risk only for higher income 
families. (Fondeville et al. 2010, 34, 36–37.)  
 
Studies show that going through family breakdown, such as divorce, increases the risk of 
over-indebtedness (Fondeville et al. 2010, 37; Disney et al. 2008, 4). EU-SILC 2008 module 
shows that twice the proportion of divorced or separated individuals was over-indebted 
compared to married individuals and 50 % more compared to unmarried individuals. The 
impact is independent of income effects and occurs among low and high-income groups, 
reflecting probably the costs and emotional effects of separation. (Fondeville et al. 2010, 37.) 
Lyon and Fisher (2006, 326–327) go through previous literature and summarize the findings 
of Del Boca (1994), Duncan and Hoffman (1985, 1988), Smock (1993) and Zagorsky (2005) 
and present that men are less likely to face financial difficulties than women because of 
divorce, because men are more likely to keep their level of income and at the same time they 
benefit from lower expenses. Lyon and Fisher (2006, 326–327) present based on the findings 
of Del Boca (1994) and Duncan and Hoffman (1985) that women are more likely to face 
financial difficulties after divorce, because they are often granted the custody of children and 
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also because they are less likely to have credit history on their own names. (Lyons & Fisher 
2006, 326–327.) 
 
Literature shows that individuals living in rented accommodation have a higher risk of 
becoming over-indebted, because they face relatively higher housing costs and tenants also 
tend to have lower than average income levels. The EU-SILC 2008 module shows that in EU 
as whole, owner-occupied housing is associated with a lower than average risk of financial 
difficulties. Low level of income and having mortgage however increase the risk of over-
indebtedness. When focusing only on the low-income households the relation is actually 
reversed: owner-occupied housing was actually associated with a higher risk than rented 
housing. (Fondeville et al. 2010, 38–39.) 
 
Another significant predictor of financial difficulties identified in literature (see, for example 
Disney et al. (2008), Disney & Gathergood (2013), Oksanen et al. (2014)) is low level of 
education. Oksanen et al. (2014) identify that low level of education is associated with both 
the prevalence of debt problems among Finnish households as well as the amount of debt 
outstanding. The impact on the risk of over-indebtedness is twofold as lower level of 
education is associated firstly with lower level of income, and secondly with low level of 
financial knowledge. Financial literacy and adequate financial skills are vital for households 
in order to make responsible financial decisions. The research on the importance of financial 
literacy will be further discussed in the following section.  
 
4.2 Financial literacy  
 
Traditional theories of consumption and saving behavior assume that consumers make 
rational choices such as saving when income is high and borrowing to sustain the acquired 
level of consumption when income is lower. Empirical studies have showed that participation 
and performance in the financial market, including the ability to make saving and borrowing 
decisions, is restricted by financial knowledge. (Gathergood 2012, 590; Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. 
2017, 190.) Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) study the results of several international studies 
using similar survey questions related to basic financial concepts such as risk diversification, 
interest rate and inflation calculations. They find that, independent of the stage of economic 
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development, low levels of financial literacy are prevalent in most of the countries studied. 
(Lusardi & Mitchell 2014, 13.)  
 
Financial literacy has an important role in financial decision-making, particularly in today’s 
financial environment where new and more complex financial services are constantly 
developed. Previous studies show that financial literacy impacts positively responsible saving, 
investment and borrowing decisions, wealth accumulation and participation in the stock 
market. (Lusardi & Mitchell 2014, 5–6, 34.) Lusardi and Tufano (2015, 4–8) show that 
households with the lowest levels of financial literacy have a significantly higher probability 
of assessing their debt burden as excessive. They study the relation of over-indebtedness and 
financial literacy with survey questions that measure both respondents’ capabilities to perform 
financial calculations and the subjective judgment of their own financial understanding. 
Gathergood (2012) bases his study also on the questions of Lusardi and Tufano (2015) and 
finds that individuals with outstanding consumer credit debt tend to give incorrect answers to 
questions related to the costs of consumer credit. He also finds that of over-indebted 
households are 33 % more likely to lack financial literacy than households on average. 
(Gathergood 2012, 595–596.)  
 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) study the economic implications of financial literacy with a 
literary survey. They argue that financially illiterate individuals are more prone to using rules 
of thumb in saving decisions2 and making financial errors3, while individuals with better 
financial knowledge are more prone to participating in the financial markets, invest in stocks4 
and undertaking retirement planning and thus accumulate more wealth5. They argue also that 
financial literacy correlates with the ability to manage regular payments6 and precautionary 
saving7 and that the least illiterate individuals tend to borrow more and with higher costs and 
accumulate less wealth8. (Lusardi & Mitchell 2014, 21–22.) 
 
Households that lack financial literacy tend to pay significantly higher costs on their credit 
than households with better financial literacy. The costs are paid in the form of financial 
                                                
2 see, Bernheim 1995, 1998  
3 see, Calvet, Campbell and Sodini 2007, 2009 
4 see, for example Kimball and Shumway 2006; Christelis, Jappelli and Padula 2010; van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie 2011; 
Yoong 2011; Almenberg and Dreber 2011; Arrondel, Debbich and Savifnac 2012 
5 Lusardi and Mitchell 2007 
6 see, Hilgert, Hogartg and Beverly 2003 
7 see, de Bassa Scheresberg 2013 
8 see, for example Stango and Zinman 2009; Lusardi and de Bassa Scheresberg 2013 
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charges that are caused by their inferior repayment habits compared to those with better 
financial understanding, and high average APRs of their portfolios. (Disney & Gathergood 
2013, 2246–2247; Lusardi & Tufano 2015, 23–25.) Lusardi and Tufano (2015, 23) find that 
on a sample of American population, households with the lowest levels of financial literacy 
pay up to 50 % higher costs on credit than on average. They find that the most illiterate 
households in the USA bear a disproportionate proportion of the total financial charges as 
they pay up to 42 % of the total costs, while the group accounts for only 29 % of the whole 
population. They argue that the most illiterate individuals tend to pay only the minimum due 
amount on credit, have repayment delinquencies and frequently exceed account limits. 
(Lusardi & Tufano 2015, 23–25.) Disney and Gathergood (2013, 2246–2247) find that 
households with the lowest levels of financial literacy have up to eight times the proportion of 
high-cost credit in their portfolios than households with better financial knowledge and the 
APRs of their portfolios are up to 9 %-points higher than average. Individuals lacking 
financial literacy frequently fail to take advantage of available borrowing opportunities with 
lower costs but instead take high-cost credit such as payday or instant loans (Lusardi & 
Mitchell 2014, 25). Argwal et al. (2009, 3–4) for example find that two thirds of people 
taking payday loans had at the time at least 1000 dollars limit available on their credit card.  
 
Hyytinen and Putkuri (2018) show that the optimism of household’s financial expectations is 
a predictor of over-indebtedness. They show that over-borrowing correlates with household’s 
capability of financial forecasting and particularly with optimism in financial decision-
making. They study Finnish households with nationally representative Income Distribution 
Statistics (IDS) panel data from 1994 to 2013, which includes register based statistics of 
households’ demographics, income and borrowing, and the survey based data collected for the 
purposes of EU-SILC. Forecasting errors are calculated from the data and linked to 
households’ borrowing behavior. They identify two categories of financial forecasting errors: 
optimistic (the expectation is better than the realized outcome) and pessimistic (the realized 
outcome exceeds the forecasted one). They argue that on average forecasting errors balance 
each other out, while the households making the optimistic errors are at greater risk of 
financial difficulties. Their results show that the households making non-prudent forecasting 
errors (household makes a forecasting error and the financial situation worsens) are 
associated with the highest debt-to-income ratios and are the most likely to report being over-
indebted. Optimism in financial expectations correlates strongly with irresponsible borrowing 
and difficulties in money management, even if the average forecasting error is not large in 
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monetary terms. These households also experience the largest income shocks, the average 
being 4,500 euros. (Hyytinen & Putkuri 2018, 56–57, 62, 67–68.) Hyytinen & Putkuri (2018, 
73) suggest that it is possible that the expectations of households making forecasting errors 
are biased and note that the likelihood of making forecasting errors is linked to the same 
characteristics that are associated with lack of financial literacy. 
 
4.3 Behavioral factors  
 
Several empirical analyses have challenged the rationality of households’ decision-making 
and showed that over-indebtedness can be a result of irrationalities within household’s 
borrowing decisions. According to behavioral studies households’ consumption and saving 
decisions are influenced by psychological factors such as impulsive consumption, 
overconfidence, social comparison and incapability of understanding the future outcomes of 
current period decisions (myopia). (Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. 2017, 190; Ladas et al. 2014, 150; 
Anderloni and Vandone 2011, 2.) Ladas et al. (2014, 150) argue that the performance of 
models explaining household indebtedness can be significantly improved by including 
psychological determinants in the model. Even though variety of significant predictors of 
financial difficulties, including psychological phenomena, have been identified and studied, 
literature does not provide any single explanatory model for modeling consumer indebtedness 
(Ladas et al. 2014, 150). The following section will focus on presenting evidence of 
behavioral phenomena that have been identified to impact the risk of over-indebtedness. 
 
Sub-optimal behavior in the credit markets can lead to financial difficulties, and in order to 
avoid them, consumers need to have financial knowledge (Gathergood 2012, 591). Behavioral 
studies have revealed inconsistencies in consumers’ time preferences and habit of using 
hyperbolic discounting in valuing cash flows. Ability to make farsighted saving plans is 
restricted by consumer’s strong preferences for immediate satisfaction from current 
consumption and without controlling unsustainable consumption-saving decisions lead to 
financial difficulties and over-indebtedness. Inconsistent time-preferences and hyperbolic 
discounting cause over-indebtedness via impulsivity and self-control problems. Consumers 
that lack self-control tend to have impulsive consumption behavior, overestimate durations of 
time intervals, and discount heavily future cash flows9. (Ottaviani & Vandone 2011, 755.) 
                                                
9 See, for example Wittman and Paulus (2008) 
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Gathergood (2012, 591–596) shows that discounting future cash flows heavily alone has 
statistically insignificant effect on over-indebting, while the impact on over-indebtedness is 
mediated by individuals’ self-control problems. Gathergood (2012) finds that over-indebted 
households have a 50 % higher probability of being heavy discounters than average, while the 
probability of being impulsive and having self-control problems is twice the average. 
 
Studies (see, for example Gathergood 2012, Kamleitner et al. 2012 and Webley & Nyhus 
2001) show that lack of self-control increases households’ probability of becoming indebted 
(Achtziger et al. 2015). Achtziger et al. (2015) study the relation of consumers’ self-control 
and the debt levels and find that the lower the level of individual’s self-control the higher is 
individual’s level of debt, and vice versa. Gathergood (2012) finds similar results and shows 
that over-indebtedness measured with repayment delinquencies and subjective financial 
distress is disproportionately higher among individuals that have self-control problems. Both 
studies find that financing impulsive consumption with debt plays a major role in causing 
over-indebtedness. Ottaviani and Vandone (2011) also find that impulsivity in financial 
decision-making leads to holding significantly higher levels of debt than on average. They 
explain the probability of holding debt with traditional socio-economic variables and 
variables that are intended to catch the effects of impulsivity and other psychological factors. 
Impulsivity is measured with Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS)10 and it scores individual’s 
impulsiveness with various factors. Ottaviani and Vandone (2011) find that after controlling 
for socio-economic variables, BIS predicts statistically significantly consumer credit levels, 
while having no significant effect on levels of mortgage. (Ottaviani & Vandone 2011, 757–
758.) 
 
Individuals that lack self-control use disproportionally more quickly accessible credit such as 
in-store credit or payday loans that facilitate impulsive consumption. Instant credit has high 
costs and by using it to finance impulsive consumption households become more vulnerable 
to debt problems. (Gathergood 2012, 591, 597–599.) Research shows (see, for example 
Berthoud and Kempson 1992) that unplanned spending increases the risk of arrears (Kempson 
2002, 48). Achtziger et al. (2015, 145–147) argue that in fact the impact of self-control to 
unsustainable debt levels is completely mediated by compulsive buying facilitated by quick-
access borrowing. Gathergood (2012, 591) even argues that self-control has an effect on over-
                                                
10 BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995 
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indebting beyond the inability to resist compulsive consumption. He finds that individuals 
lacking self-control and financial literacy have a higher probability of facing adverse financial 
shocks and argues that it is due to they are impulsive in making other decisions as well, 
regarding employment for example. He shows that after controlling for unexpected financial 
shocks, the relevance of self-control and financial literacy decreases. Part of the relationship 
of self-control and over-indebtedness can thus be explained by the higher than average 
probability of impulsive individuals to face financial shocks. (Gathergood 2012, 591, 599–
600.) Bertrand, Mullainathan and Shafir (2004) argue that the poor are particularly bound by 
the lack of self-control. Scarcity of economic resources highlights the impact of biases when 
the financial margins for errors are narrow. Shah, Mullainathan and Shafir (2012) study the 
impact of scarcity on financial decision-making. They argue that due to scarcity, frequent 
expenses that normally when resources are adequate do not require much attention (such as 
buying groceries) require substantial focus, when resources are scarce. Due to focus on 
making ends meet is substantial other problems become neglected. Scarcity may lead to high-
cost borrowing with short maturities, since these loans are easily available and alleviate 
making ends meet, while households neglect the implications the costs of repayment will 
have. Making ends meet requires a large part of attention and causes a cognitive burden that 
hinders the performance of households in other decision-making. Cognitive load may prevent 
households from being able to correctly estimate optimal borrowing rates or lead to excessive 
financial risk-taking. (Shah et al. 2012.) 
 
Social comparison is another emotional driver of excessive indebtedness. Evidence for 
“keeping up with the Joneses” or other hypotheses about social comparison driven 
indebtedness are found in the literature. Lea et al. (1995, 691) study psychological factors of 
indebtedness and money-management and find that indebted consumers are more likely to 
judge having below average economic resources and also find the inequality bothering. 
Cameron and Colby (1990) find two main determinants for positive relation of income and 
debt: social comparison and unreasonable risk-taking that is associated with lack of self-
control. Following the relative income hypothesis of Duesenberry (1949), they show that 
social comparison leads to excessive borrowing when the income level rises as they are 
pressured to keep with the consumption of their peers for comparison become wealthier. 
Livingstone and Lunt (1992) find that the higher the debt level of household, the less likely 
they are to admit feeling pressure of social comparisons, while the other attributes they 
reported for their debt problems did not differ from households with less debt, indicating the 
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hazardous impact of denial and ignorance. Coibion et al. (2014) for example find 
contradicting results and show that in fact over-indebtedness among low-income households 
is less common in areas with high inequality than in areas with low inequality. They study the 
impact of social comparison on the high levels of debt in mid 2000’s among low-income 
households in the U.S. They argue that credit supply restricts irresponsible borrowing when 
inequality is high as better income levels are the stronger indicator of creditworthiness, the 
higher inequality is. They argue that low-income households accumulated high levels of debt 
due to large credit expansion that targeted low-income households and that the causal link of 
inequality and debt goes through credit supply. Their results show that social comparison did 
not contribute to the debt crisis in the U.S.   
 
4.4 Over-commitment and credit market policies 
 
Over-commitment is identified in literature as one of the most important determinants of 
over-indebtedness, alongside with adverse income shocks. Households’ capability to service 
and repay debt decreases with the number of credit commitments household has, increasing 
the probability of over-indebtedness. Over-commitment increases household’s probability of 
falling behind on payments as controlling one’s finances gets more difficult as the number of 
commitments increases. Previous studies show (see, for example Berthoud and Kempson 
1992; Kempson et al. 2004) that the severity of household’s arrears increases with the number 
of credit commitments and the proportion of monthly income household needs to spend on 
credit repayment. Davydoff et al. (2008, 21) argue that in fact the number of unsecured credit 
commitments impacts household’s risk of over-indebtedness more than the amount of credit. 
Research shows that the impact of the amount of credit is less pronounced, i.e. having one 
large commitment is associated with a lower risk of over-indebtedness than havinf the same 
amount spread into multiple commitments. Davydoff et al. (2008, 21) argue that the 
difference is likely to be due to repayment period of one large commitment is longer than of 
the multiple smaller commitments. Having to make additional credit contracts to make ends 
meet is a clear sign of financial difficulties and a major trigger of over-indebtedness. 
(Davydoff et al. 2008, 21; Disney et al. 2008, 52–54; Kempson 2002, 45–46.) Kempson 
(2002) identifies also other indicators of irresponsible borrowing than repaying existing debt: 
borrowing despite being aware of repayment problems and financing unplanned spending 
with credit. Kempson (2002) finds that in fact a major part of households in financial 
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difficulties had anticipated their repayment struggles since two thirds of households studied 
that were uncertain about their repayment capabilities, faced financial difficulties at the time 
of the survey. (Kempson 2002, 44–47.) Unplanned spending is closely related to impulsive 
consumption that will be discussed in further detail in the following section. 
 
Ottaviani and Vandone (2011) show that the determinants of decision-making process depend 
on the type of credit, due to the different lengths of time-horizons related to secured or 
unsecured borrowing. Decisions regarding secured credit such as mortgage need to be made 
considering a significantly long time-horizon and decisions are thus made more in accordance 
with the rationale of LCH than decisions related to unsecured borrowing that is based on 
fulfilling short run needs. Decisions related to unsecured credit are determined by one’s 
willingness to finance consumption with credit and are more prone to non-rational behavior. 
(Ottaviani & Vandone 2011, 755–760.) Betti et al. (2007, 146–147) show that over-
indebtedness is in fact a significant problem especially among households that have consumer 
credit commitments, as approximately half of them were over-indebted. Kukk (2016, 18) 
finds that the balance of consumer credit is in fact the main driver of arrears in the highest 
income quintiles that have better access to credit markets. Highest income quintiles borrow 
consumer credit proportionally more than households in lower income levels among which 
arrears are mainly driven by income shocks and high debt service to income ratios. 
 
Credit market conditions seem to also impact over-indebtedness. Betti et al. (2007) find that 
in countries with more liberalized consumer credit markets, the proportion of over-indebted 
households tends to be significantly lower than in countries with restricted credit market 
policies. Households that face liquidity constraints are not able to optimally smooth their 
lifetime consumption and face the risk of financial difficulties especially when facing 
unexpected adverse shocks. Even though consumer credit has shown to influence the risk of 
over-indebtedness, it is an important source of liquidity that households can utilize to smooth 
short-term shocks. The inability to borrow can lead to severe financial problems, when 
households are not able to make ends meet. Betti et al. (2007) find that in countries with 
restrictive credit market policies, households are actually the most likely to take consumer 
credit when they are already at the risk of over-indebtedness. (Betti et al. 2007, 146–147.) 
 
In perfect credit markets households would be able to borrow against their expected income 
with an interest based on risk pricing. In reality this however is not an attractive option for 
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lenders, since full-risk pricing would probably attract high-risk borrowers that have a 
significantly higher probability of defaulting and may risk lender’s profitability. Credit 
market restrictions originate from asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders and 
due to adverse selection lenders use credit rationing or demand collateral against credit to 
exclude high risk lending. (Disney et al. 2008, 16; Rinaldi & Sanchis-Arellano 2006, 12.) 
Current income and household’s ability to provide collateral thus constrain their borrowing 
possibilities (Rinaldi & Sanchis-Arellano 2006, 12–13; Disney et al. 2008, 16). Betti et al. 
(2007, 152) identify a group of under-indebted households that are at the greatest risk of 
poverty, at even higher risk than the over-indebted households and considerably higher 
compared to the population as a whole. These households have a very low level of income 
and high consumption to income ratios, consuming everything they earn. They are restricted 
from the credit markets due to their low capability to repay debt. Under-indebted households 
have difficulties in making ends meet due to liquidity constraints and in they would benefit 
from credit market liberalization and full-risk pricing. (Betti et al. 2007, 152.) 
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5 EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE DETERMINANTS OF 
OVER-INDEBTEDNESS 
 
 
The following chapter presents empirical research conducted of the level and determinants of 
over-indebtedness. The research identifies household characteristics that expose them to over-
indebtedness and estimates the impact of these factors on the risk of over-indebtedness. The 
study focuses first on the determinants of over-indebtedness among Finnish households and 
then makes comparisons with two other European countries. This study utilizes the European 
Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) that is a pan-European 
multidimensional micro-data survey. The comparability of the EU-SILC survey data is 
regarded to be very good since it is collected with the same frequency and the questions are 
harmonized across countries (Davydoff et al. 2008, 46).  
 
The following section 5.1 first describes the used EU-SILC survey data and estimation 
methodology. Section 5.2 focuses in detail on the Finnish EU-SILC survey and examines the 
characteristics of over-indebted households. Two probit estimation models are also presented 
that examine the probability of household being in arrears and at risk of over-indebtedness. 
Section 5.3 focuses on making comparisons between Finnish, Swedish and British households 
by comparing the descriptive statistics and probit estimation results of households being in 
arrears and at risk of over-indebtedness. Credit market policies in the UK are very liberal 
compared to the two reference countries, due to which it is interesting to compare the 
determinants of over-indebtedness and characteristics of over-indebted households. Sweden 
on the other hand has a similar Nordic social security system than in Finland, while the levels 
of mortgage of Swedish households are significantly higher. An interesting aspect is to study 
the impact of high mortgage levels on the determinants of over-indebtedness.  
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5.1 Data and methodology 
 
The following section 5.1.1 will present the EU-SILC data that is used to study the 
determinants and characteristics of household over-indebtedness. The second section 5.1.2 
will then present the estimation methodology and variables used in the estimations. 
 
5.1.1 EU-SILC data  
 
EU-SILC collects data on indicators that are important in monitoring the fulfillment of EU’s 
poverty and social exclusion reduction targets and in following the national level 
development. Reducing poverty and social exclusion are one of the main targets of Europe 
2020 strategy, which aims at sustainable growth in EU that improves its competitiveness, 
productivity and sustainable market economy. Besides poverty reduction, Europe 2020 targets 
focus on employment, research and development, climate change, energy and education. The 
target of poverty and social exclusion reduction is to reduce the number of people at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion in the EU by 20 million. The national level target in Finland is to 
reduce the number of people at risk by 150 000. (Eurostat 2018a; Davydoff et al. 2008, 41.)  
 
EU-SILC survey includes cross-sectional and longitudinal data on households’ living 
conditions, income, poverty and social exclusion. EU-SILC measures both subjective and 
objective aspects of income, social inclusion and living conditions. Data is collected yearly 
and concerns the 12 months period before the interview. Longitudinal data is collected at a 
four-year rotating panel and it can be used to study individual level changes over time. EU-
SILC survey interviews approximately 130 000 households every year for cross-sectional and 
100 000 for longitudinal data operation. (Eurostat 2018a.) The EU-SILC data was selected 
due to it collects data widely on financial difficulties. The survey includes data on 
households’ arrears, their liquidity situation and financial burden. Data is collected with an 
interview and it represents households’ subjective judgment of their financial situation. The 
survey collects data on arrears by asking whether household has been in arrears, i.e. unable to 
pay on time their commitments due to financial difficulties, during the 12 months period 
before the interview. It also uncovers household’s illiquidity problems by asking them to 
evaluate their capacities to face unexpected financial expenses with their own resources 
without having to ask for financial help or borrow more. Households are also requested to 
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evaluate their capabilities to make ends meet, which measures whether household has 
sufficient current resources to cover monthly expenses. The survey also takes into account 
households’ financial exposure by asking them to judge the financial burden they are facing 
related to housing costs or loan repayment. (Davydoff et al. 2008, 53.)  
 
5.1.2 Estimation methodology 
 
Two indicators of over-indebtedness are constructed from the EU-SILC data for the purposes 
of this study. The first dependent variable is based on information of household’s arrears that 
are commonly used in the literature to indicate illiquidity and increased risk of insolvency. 
Davydoff et al (2008, 41) argue that arrears are in general considered as a good measure of 
financial problems and indicator of an increased risk of over-indebtedness due to they clearly 
reflect households’ repayment problems. As discussed in the chapter 2, arrears are triggered 
by affordability problems when household is no longer able to meet its expenses due to over-
commitment or adverse shocks to income or expenses. 
 
Arrears in EU-SILC data are collected at household level and separately for three types of 
commitments. Households are asked if they have been in arrears on (1) mortgage or rental 
payments, (2) utility bills or (3) hire purchase installments or other loans in the past 12 
months. Households that report arrears are also asked to specify whether they have been in 
arrears only once or twice or more. The first dependent variable HIA (household in arrears) is 
constructed based on these survey questions. HIA is a dummy variable that gets value 1 if 
household has been in arrears at least once during the past 12 months and value 0 if household 
has not been in arrears or the question is not applicable due to household does not have the 
commitment in question. The first indicator HIA takes into consideration all households with 
arrears. Arrears are based only on interview answers and thus do not necessarily represent 
official records of payment defaults. Arrears considered in the survey represent also payment 
delinquencies that are not recorded in official credit information registers. On the other hand, 
all registered payment defaults are not represented in the survey as it focuses only on new 
arrears occurred in the past 12 months. Payment defaults that have occurred before that and 
have a repayment schedule that household follows are not considered as arrears in the survey.  
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Davydoff et al. (2008, 42–43) point out in their report that there are major differences in how, 
and by whom, statistics on arrears are registered and in the terminology used. They argue that 
variations with data collection methods and frequency diminish the reliability of arrears as a 
measure of over-indebtedness. The collection of EU-SILC data however is harmonized, and 
the information of arrears is collected with a survey. Variations between data collection 
methods can thus be assumed to be minimal and the reliability of the measure better than 
when comparing national measurements. There can still be differences on the scale how 
arrears present over-indebtedness, since the severity of arrears is dependent on the culture and 
regulation towards payment delinquencies. In addition, arrears are more severe the longer 
they last, which increases difficulties in comparing the level of over-indebtedness based on 
only arrears. (Fondeville et al. 2010, 4.) One shortcoming of the selected approach is that it 
does not take into consideration the severity of the arrears, i.e. the duration and amount of 
them. As discussed in chapter 2.3, it may be optimal for households to fall into temporary 
arrears if they are expecting their financial situation to improve and that they are able to pay 
back their arrears in the near future. More severe financial difficulties are triggered by the 
dual-trigger situation when household has both negative equity and affordability problems. 
Such severe illiquidity issues will result in longer-term arrears. (Gerlack-Kristen & Lyons 
2017, 3.)  
 
The second indicator of over-indebtedness is constructed to identify households at risk of 
more severe and longer-term financial difficulties. The study follows the definition suggested 
by Davydoff et al. (2008, 55–56) in the report prepared for the European Commission for 
measuring households at risk of over-indebtedness that are a sub-group of households in 
arrears. In addition to arrears, the indicator takes into account household’s subjective financial 
burden and illiquidity problems. The second dependent variable HAROI (household at risk of 
over-indebtedness) is based on the definition of Davydoff et al. (2008) and constructed 
following Angel and Heitzmann (2015, 335). Household is considered to be at risk of over-
indebtedness if it (1) has been in arrears during the past 12 months before the survey either 
with mortgage or rent payments, utility bills or other loan repayment (HIA = 1), (2) considers 
the financial burden of housing costs (mortgage or rent payments) or repaying other loans at 
least heavy, (3) considers making ends meet difficult or very difficult and (4) reports not 
having capacity to face unexpected financial expenses. This approach differs with one point 
from the construction of Angel and Heitzmann (2015, 335), which also excludes households 
that expect their financial situation to improve within the next 12 months. Excluding these 
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households could ensure that only households that are facing structural arrears would be 
considered as over-indebted, which is in line with the definition of Davydoff et al. (2008, 55–
56). The regular EU-SILC survey does not however include the same question, as the 2008 
special module of over-indebtedness used by Angel and Heitzmann (2015), and the expected 
duration of the arrears cannot be measured with the data in use. 
 
Davydoff et al. (2008, 56) point out that important shortcomings of the presented approach 
are that the regular EU-SILC survey does not take households’ debt to asset position or debt-
servicing expenditure into consideration. They also argue that the picture of household’s 
overall financial situation is incomplete due to the survey does not collect data on household’s 
overall debt and asset positions. Davydoff et al. (2008, 53) also point out that the regular EU-
SILC survey does not collect information of the total amount of debt or other commitments 
household has in arrears, alike the 2008 special module. Betti et al. (2007, 144) however 
argue that households are best to judge whether their level of debt is excessive. As discussed 
in chapter 2.1 the subjective approach supposes that households that report having difficulties 
with debt repayment have weighted their level of debt to their current and expected earnings 
and liquid assets and judged the debt level to exceed their repayment capacities without 
compromising their minimum standard of living. An unambiguous measure of excessive debt 
level for the whole sample of households would also be hard to define, which supports using 
subjective measures. (Betti et al. 2007, 144.) Subjective measures however do inevitably 
depend on household’s interpretation of what are meant with terms like “heavy financial 
burden” or “having difficulties in making ends meet”. Using arrears as an indicator of 
financial problems can alleviate the impact of subjective interpretations since arrears are 
rather an objective measure than a subjective one. (Fondeville et al. 2010, 4.)   
 
The probit models run in the following sections explain the probability of arrears and over-
indebtedness with independent variables drawn from the literature survey presented in chapter 
4. The EU-SILC survey collects data widely on households’ socio-economic characteristics 
on personal and on household level. The relevant individual level characteristics included in 
the analysis are sex, age, employment status, marital status and the level of education. 
Household level determinants included are household’s income level, family type and tenure 
status. The cross-sectional EU-SILC survey does not include data on household’s income 
shocks but as discussed in the literature survey, the most important reasons for adverse shocks 
to household’s finances are loss of employment and divorce or separation. The impact of 
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these variables will be taken separately into consideration in the analysis. The study also 
estimates the impact of higher credit exposure with a dummy variable that captures whether 
household has hire purchase installments or other non-housing related loans. These loans 
include all secured and unsecured commercial credits, credit cards and store credit, student 
loans and mail orders. The regular EU-SILC survey does not collect data of the level of 
financial literacy or of any psychological determinants, which were identified in chapters 3 
and 4 as possible causes of irresponsible borrowing and over-indebtedness. The impact of any 
psychological determinants or financial illiteracy cannot be estimated, however their impact 
on the results will be discussed. Majority of the determinants in the estimation are individual 
level variables, while the dependent variables are collected at household level. The household 
level characteristics are combined to the individual level data. As the head of household is not 
identifiable from the EU-SILC data, the individual level variables represent the impact of the 
characteristic on the probability of individual living in a household with arrears. Variables are 
weighted with their cross-sectional weights in order to represent the whole population. 
 
Due to the dependent estimation variables HIA and HAROI are binary, this study utilizes 
probit model to estimate the impact of independent variables on over-indebtedness. Linear 
estimation models would face problems in restricting the possible values between 0 and 1 and 
result in heteroskedasticity in the error term. The general presentation of binary choice model 
is: 
 
(4)  ! !! ! !!!! ! !!!! !!!,  
 
which states that the probability of having ! ! !, (i.e. household being in arrears or at risk of 
over-indebtedness) depends on the vector !! of independent variables that is constructed from 
household socio-economic characteristics. The function !  is traditionally restricted to 
functions of form ! !! !! ! !!!!!!!. Since the values of both ! and ! need to be restricted 
between [0, 1], the function ! is traditionally described with a distribution function. In the 
case of probit model, the standard distribution function is chosen: 
 
(5)  ! ! ! ! ! ! !!! !"# ! !! !! !"!!! !  
 
 53 
 
The impact of a change in !! depends on the value of !!, due to which the magnitude of probit 
estimation coefficient is not directly interpretable. The sign of the impact can be interpreted 
directly, while the magnitude needs to be calculated using partial derivatives. The impact of a 
change in a dummy variable is estimated by calculating the implied probabilities of the two 
possible outcomes, while other explanatory variables are fixed. (Verbeek 2004, 190–193.)  
 
The general hypothesis for the HIA and HAROI probit model estimations are: 
H0: Socio-economic characteristic does not affect the probability of arrears / risk 
of over-indebtedness 
H1:  Socio-economic characteristic affects the probability of arrears / risk of 
over-indebtedness 
 
Many of the independent variables are divided into categories and the estimation results 
reveal whether there is a statistically significant difference between the impact of different 
categories on the probability of arrears or the risk of over-indebtedness.  
 
5.2 Over-indebtedness in Finland 
 
The study utilizes cross-sectional EU-SILC data collected in 2015. Finnish cross-sectional 
EU-SILC survey includes 10 267 household level and 26 422 level individual surveys. Data is 
collected by telephone interviews and from the registers of Statistics of Finland. Statistics 
Finland conducts the survey annually and selects randomly one at least 16 years old 
household member to answer the survey questions in a telephone interview, while also other 
household members are given the opportunity to participate. Each interviewed household is 
selected for the survey by weighting specific factors and they each are representative of 
approximately 200 other Finnish households in similar situation. The data used will be 
weighted with cross-sectional weights in order to represent the population as whole. 
(Statistics Finland 2018.)  
 
5.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
EU-SILC 2015 statistics reveal that 8.8 % of all Finnish households had been in arrears at 
least once in the past 12 months. The most common were arrears on utility bills as 6.2 % of 
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all households had been in arrears with utility bills at least once. 3.8 % of all households 
reported arrears with rent or mortgage payments and 3.2 % with other loan repayment 
including consumer credit commitments and student loans. The descriptive statistics of 
households in arrears are presented in the Table 1. Majority of households in arrears reported 
the incident occurring at least twice in the past 12 months: four out of five households in 
arrears with utility bills, almost two thirds with mortgage or rental payments and 70 % with 
other loan repayment were in arrears at least twice during the preceding year. 
 
Table 1: Proportion of households in arrears 
Households considered Households in arrears (%) 
On mortgage or rent  On utility bills  On other loans  Total  
Whole population 3.8 6.2 3.2 8.8 
Households having the 
commitment in question 6.1  6.2 6.5 8.8 
 
The second row of Table 1 presents the statistics of arrears when considering only the 
proportion of households having the commitment in question. Almost half of all households 
had either consumer credit commitments or student loans and among these households, 
arrears were a slightly more common than arrears on utility bills that are relevant to 
practically all households. Also, when considering only the 62 % of Finnish households that 
had mortgage or rental payments arrears become almost as common.  
 
EU-SILC data reveals that a significant proportion of Finnish household faces financial 
difficulties as summarized in Table 2. Almost 17 % of surveyed households judged mortgage 
or rental payments as a heavy burden and 5 % of households felt burdened by repayment of 
other loans. Illiquidity issues were also common among Finnish households: 24 % of Finnish 
households expected not to have capacity to face unexpected expenses, which indicates that 
almost one fourth of the population has not prepared for any adverse economic shocks. 6 % of 
households were already currently having difficulties to make ends meet and 2.0 % of 
households fulfilled all four criteria of being at risk of over-indebtedness (HAROI) i.e. being 
in arrears, feeling burdened by housing costs or debt repayment, being unable to cover 
unexpected expenses and having difficulties to make ends meet.  
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Table 2: Proportion of households facing financial difficulties 
Burden of 
housing costs (%) 
Burden of debt 
repayment (%) 
Unable to face 
unexpected expenses (%) 
Difficult to make 
ends meet (%) 
HAROI 
(%) 
16.7 4.9  23.5  5.9  2.0  
 
Table 3 presents the statistics of arrears sorted by whether household reports financial 
difficulties or not. Presumably, the statistics show that arrears are associated with illiquidity 
issues and being burdened by financial commitments. Financial burden is strongly associated 
with arrears, while households not burdened by rent or loan repayment were significantly less 
likely to report arrears. Almost one fourth of households burdened with rent or mortgage were 
already in arrears, while the relation of consumer credit burden and more severe financial 
difficulties seems even more evident as almost half burdened with other loan repayment were 
already in arrears. The statistics further show that illiquidity issues impact the likelihood of 
arrears as almost one fourth of households reporting being unable to face unexpected 
expenses and 45 % currently having difficulties to make ends meet were in arrears, while yet 
again the proportion was significantly lower among households not reporting illiquidity 
issues. 
 
Table 3: Proportion of households in arrears per financial difficulty 
Facing financial 
difficulties 
Households in arrears (%) 
Burden of 
housing costs 
Burden of debt 
repayment 
Unable to face 
unexpected expenses 
Difficult to make 
ends meet 
Yes 22.0 47.2 23.9 44.7 
No 4.8 5.6  2.7 5.3 
 
The figures presented in Table 3 support the assumption that arrears are mainly driven by 
illiquidity and current affordability problems instead of irresponsible behavior. However, the 
statistics indicate that there are households that are not burdened by financial commitments or 
facing illiquidity issues, yet still have been in arrears. These proportions perhaps represent the 
part of population impacted by limited rationality or financial literacy or have an indifferent 
attitude towards managing household finances.  
 
EU-SILC data shows that the likelihood of arrears tends to decrease with age, as predicted by 
previous literature. The statistics presented in Table 4 show that arrears tend to fall especially 
among those aged 45 years or older and a significant drop in the level of arrears can be 
perceived among those aged over 60. The statistics on arrears are similar to the findings of 
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Fondeville et al. (2010, 34–35) regarding the rate of over-indebtedness between age groups in 
Europe. They find only marginal differences in the rate of over-indebtedness between the 
youngest age groups, while the oldest age group is associated with a significantly lower rate 
of over-indebtedness. 
 
Table 4: Arrears per age group 
Age group HIA (%) 
! 25 11.3 
26–35 11.1 
36–45 11.7 
46–60 8.6 
> 60 2.4 
 
Table 4 shows that among the three youngest age groups (ages 0–25, 26–35 and 36–45), 
approximately 11 % was in arrears, while the proportion was 8.6 % among those aged 46–60 
and only 2.4 % among those aged 60 or more. Literature suggests that the risk of over-
indebtedness is increased among the youngest age group because they are the most eager to 
finance consumption with credit and tend to have low levels of income. Statistics show that 
the average debt to income ratio among young indebted adults in Finland is the highest of all 
age groups. However, the rate of indebtedness was only 65 % among the youngest group, 
while the rate among those aged 25–44 was over 180 %, explaining why the high debt-to-
income ratios of young indebted households are not reflected in the statistics of Table 4. (OSF 
2015.) Other factors may also explain why the statistics do not show increased arrears among 
the youngest age group. One important factor is that the proportion of households with 
children is lower among the youngest group. The EU-SILC data also confirms that having 
children increases the likelihood of becoming over-indebted. The statistics show that 6 % of 
households without children were in arrears, while the proportion was twice as high among 
households with dependent children. The statistics confirm that single parents are particularly 
at risk, since 18 % of them were in arrears.  
 
Literature suggests that the likelihood of arrears and over-indebtedness is strongly linked to 
low income. Table 5 presents the statistics of arrears and risk of over-indebtedness by income 
quintile. The statistics show that the likelihood of arrears decreases the higher the income 
quintile and that the relation of being at risk of over-indebtedness follows a similar pattern. 
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Table 5: HIA and HAROI by income quintiles 
Income quintile HIA (%) HAROI (%) 
1st 12.9 3.9 
2nd 10.9 4.0 
3rd 7.3 2.1 
4th 5.7 1.0 
5th 2.6 0.3 
 
Statistics in Table 5 show that the rate of arrears is the highest among the first income quintile 
of which almost 13 % was in arrears while the proportion was only 2.6 % among the fifth 
quintile. The rate of arrears between income quintiles declines approximately 2–3 percentage 
points per quintile. The proportion at risk of over-indebtedness declines also with the level of 
income, however it remains at approximately 4 % in the first and second income quintiles and 
declines only from the third quintile onwards. Based on the suggestion of Kempson and 
Atkinson (2006, 24–25) presented in the section 4.1, the persisting risk of over-indebtedness 
among the two lowest income quintiles could possibly be explained with their illiquidity 
issues. Kempson and Atkinson (2006, 24–25) argue that financial struggles in the two lowest 
quintiles are mainly driven by the low level of income, and not by excessive borrowing. 
Households in the two lowest income quintiles are typically struggling to make ends meet and 
if they have debt, the costs of it are high, making it almost inevitable that they are struggling 
with the repayment of it. The statistics presented by Peura-Kapanen et al. (2015, 16) also 
indicate that among households in the lowest income quintile (or two lowest income deciles) 
the average level of debt is lower than the median income, while the relation is the other way 
around in the higher quintiles (or deciles). This could imply that over-commitment plays a 
role in increasing the risk of over-indebtedness among households in the second income 
quintile and that the debt servicing costs could outweigh the impact of better liquidity.  
 
Literature shows that high credit exposure and the number of credit commitments increases 
the risk of over-indebtedness. Since the EU-SILC does not collect data on the number or 
amount of household’s loans, the impact of additional credit commitments or the level of debt 
could not be tested. Studies show that in general, having consumer credit increases 
household’s risk of financial difficulties. The EU-SILC statistics presented in Table 6 support 
the assumption and show that the likelihood of being in arrears was 11 percentage points 
higher among households with other loan commitments (the EU-SILC data does not enable 
separating consumer credit commitments from all other non-housing related loans) compared 
to households without. The group of households marked as having consumer credit in Table 6 
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might thus include households that have only student loans. The statistics show that among 
households that do not hold consumer credit the rates of arrears and over-indebtedness are 
clearly lower than average. A significant difference is also perceived at levels of HAROI: 
only 0.6 % of households without consumer credit are at the risk of over-indebtedness while 
4.0 % of households with consumer credit fulfill the criteria.  
 
Table 6: HIA and HAROI by credit commitments 
Credit commitment HIA (%) HAROI (%) 
Consumer credit No 2.5 0.6 Yes 13.5 4.0 
Mortgage No 7.2 2.1 Yes 9.1 2.5 
 
Concerning mortgage, the variation of financial difficulties is smaller between the two 
groups. Statistics of HIA and HAROI presented in Table 6 show that 9 % of households with 
mortgage were in arrears, while the proportion was 7 % among the ones without. 2 % of 
households without mortgage were at risk of over-indebtedness, while only a slightly higher 
proportion of households with mortgage fulfilled the criteria. Literature suggests that the 
different impacts related to mortgage and consumer credit can be explained with different 
lengths of time-horizons due to which behavioral biases impact decisions related to consumer 
credit more than mortgage. Consumer credit commitments also include high-cost debt that 
may increase household’s debt burden to excessive levels. 
 
Even though mortgage forms the largest part of household debt, also a significant part of 
households without mortgage was in arrears. Significant part of these households live in 
rented accommodation and as previous studies show, tenants can be identified as one main 
risk group of over-indebtedness, due to their relatively high housing costs and low levels of 
income. The EU-SILC statistics show that households living in rented accommodation have 
an increased likelihood of being in arrears and at risk of over-indebtedness. 13 % of tenants 
reported arrears and 4 % of the group was at risk of over-indebtedness, both of which are 
above the average. Approximately 11 % of tenants reported arrears on rental payments and 
utility bills and 6 % on other loan repayment. Table 7 summarizes the statistics of HIA and 
HAROI by tenure status. In the light of Table 7, households living rent-free seem to be 
another risk group of over-indebtedness as almost 9 % of them were in arrears and 4 % fulfill 
the criteria of HAROI. These households however present only 0.8 % of all households. 
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Table 7: HIA and HAROI by tenure status 
Tenure status HIA (%) HIA mortgage 
or rent (%) 
HIA utility 
bills (%) 
HIA other 
loans (%) 
HAROI 
(%) 
Outright owner 2.9 0.1 3.1 1.8 0.6 
Owner paying mortgage 9.1 4.5 9.5 4.1 2.5 
Tenant 12.5 11.3 11.1 6.4 4.0 
Free 8.7 0.5 7.2 1.9 3.8 
 
The likelihood of financial difficulties differs depending on household’s tenure status, which 
is due to their different levels of disposable income and relative housing costs. The risk 
measured with both HIA and HAROI is the lowest among outright owners that tend to have 
relatively low housing costs and higher levels of income and assets than the other groups. 
Having mortgage on the other hand increases household’s expenses and debt exposure and is 
associated with a higher likelihood of financial difficulties. 9 % of households with mortgage 
were in arrears, most commonly with utility bills and 2.5 % of households with mortgage 
were at risk of over-indebtedness. This probably reflects the severe repercussions of mortgage 
arrears, as due to arrears creditors have the right to declare the mortgage as defaulted and the 
whole outstanding amount of mortgage can become due for payment all at once. As it is 
unlikely that household with mortgage arrears could repay the mortgage all at once, the 
collateral, which in practice means the home of the household, needs to be realized. Unpaid 
utility bills on the other hand, while they accrue interest and costs on arrears and may 
eventually lead to payment defaults, the amounts due are significantly smaller and also the 
timeline to repay arrears before they are declared defaults is longer. When facing financial 
burden, households attempt to avoid mortgage arrears to the last by delaying other payments 
if necessary. Increasing rate of arrears on mortgage repayment is an indicator of increasing 
risk on the financial stability of the economy, and the development of it should be closely 
monitored. 
 
The EU-SILC statistics presented in Table 8 show that the likelihood of arrears differs 
between different economic statuses. The statistics suggest that unemployment is a risk factor 
of over-indebtedness, since the level of arrears among unemployed was as high as 18 %, ten 
percentage points higher than among employed. The second most common arrears were 
among individuals with status ‘Other’, which includes all other economic statuses outside the 
labor market (permanently disabled, individuals fulfilling domestic tasks and other inactive 
persons). The level of arrears was also increased among students, of which 10 % was in 
arrears. The increased likelihood of arrears among unemployed, other inactive and students 
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might be mainly due to their relatively lower levels of income. Students usually also belong to 
the youngest age group and are thus more vulnerable to debt problems. 
 
Table 8: Employment status and HIA 
Employment status HIA (%) 
Employed 8.2 
Unemployed 18.3 
Student 10.4 
Retired 1.8 
Other  13.5 
 
The statistics in Table 8 show that arrears were significantly less common among retired 
individuals that typically have repaid their loans and are considered to be more responsible in 
their spending. An interesting aspect for the probit estimation is to examine whether the 
economic statuses have an independent impact on the risk of over-indebtedness when the 
level of income and age is controlled.  
 
Table 9 reports arrears by the level of education. Higher level of education is associated with 
lower risk of arrears, as predicted by previous studies. The EU-SILC data reveals that 
households with only basic education or upper secondary education are almost twice more 
likely to be in arrears than individuals with tertiary education, which is associated with higher 
level of earnings and also financial literacy that increases abilities with financial decision-
making and reduces the risk of financial difficulties.  
 
Table 9: Households in arrears by education levels 
Education level HIA (%) 
Basic education 8.9 
Upper secondary 9.5 
Tertiary 4.8 
 
The likelihood of arrears however does not decrease with the level of education per se. In fact, 
arrears were more common among households with upper secondary than households with 
only basic education. 9 % of individuals with only basic education were in arrears while the 
proportion was slightly higher (9.5 %) among individuals with upper secondary education. 
Higher likelihood of arrears among individuals with upper secondary education may be 
explained with their better access to credit markets, due to better employment and earning 
prospects. Better creditworthiness improves the liquidity situation while higher debt exposure 
increases their financial burden. 
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5.2.2 Probit estimations 
 
The following section will utilize probit model to estimate the impacts of household’s socio-
economic variables on its risk of over-indebtedness. Probit models are estimated for two 
dependent variables HIA (household in arrears) and HAROI (household at risk of over-
indebtedness) presented in chapter 5.1.2. The Wald test is passed for both HIA and HAROI 
probit estimation models and the coefficients of determination are statistically significant at 5 
% risk level. The HIA probit model explains 19.9 % of the variation on the probability of 
having arrears and takes 16 132 observations into consideration. The HAROI probit model 
explains 21.2 % of the variation of the risk of over-indebtedness and takes 16 128 
observations into consideration. The number of observations in the two probit estimations 
differ due to a few missing values in survey questions that are used in constructing the 
dependent variable HAROI. These observations, for which it was not possible to deduct the 
value of HAROI, have thus been omitted from the second estimation. The estimation results 
for both models are presented in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Probit estimation results 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 HIA HAROI 
Sex   
Male (Reference category) 
Female 0.0108 0.105 
 (0.0440) (0.0692) 
Income quintiles   
1st income quintile (Reference category) 
2nd income quintile -0.201*** -0.0871 
 (0.0643) (0.0865) 
3rd income quintile -0.546*** -0.442*** 
 (0.0705) (0.105) 
4th income quintile -0.724*** -0.760*** 
 (0.0792) (0.135) 
5th income quintile -0.865*** -1.112*** 
 (0.0822) (0.190) 
Age groups   
! 25  (Reference category) 
26–35 0.173* 0.148 
 (0.0933) (0.123) 
36–45 0.244** 0.319** 
 (0.0966) (0.133) 
46–60 0.193** 0.369*** 
 (0.0963) (0.135) 
>60 -0.0905 -0.234 
 (0.156) (0.277) 
Marital status   
Married (Reference category) 
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Never married 0.00866 -0.0605 
 (0.0597) (0.0941) 
Divorced/separated 0.0251 0.113 
 (0.0803) (0.117) 
Widowed -0.106 0.105 
 (0.149) (0.226) 
Household type   
Adult(s) without children (Reference category) 
Single parent 0.141 0.0776 
 (0.0960) (0.138) 
2 adults with children -0.0430 0.100 
 (0.0620) (0.0932) 
Tenure status   
Outright owner (Reference category) 
Owner paying mortgage 0.221*** 0.319*** 
 (0.0620) (0.108) 
Tenant 0.224*** 0.488*** 
 (0.0702) (0.111) 
Free 0.276 0.568* 
 (0.208) (0.331) 
Consumer credit  0.935*** 0.928*** 
 (0.0562) (0.0942) 
Employment status   
Employed (Reference category) 
Unemployed 0.299*** 0.321*** 
 (0.0795) (0.108) 
Student -0.131 0.0612 
 (0.0861) (0.114) 
Retired -0.488*** 0.125 
 (0.148) (0.300) 
Other inactive 0.0860 0.210* 
 (0.0795) (0.115) 
Level of education   
Basic education (Reference category) 
Upper secondary -0.175*** -0.185** 
 (0.0604) (0.0826) 
Tertiary -0.414*** -0.582*** 
 (0.0696) (0.113) 
   
Constant -1.619*** -2.834*** 
 (0.149) (0.225) 
   
Observations 16,132 16,128 
Pseudo R2 0.1990 0.2119 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The probit estimations show that the level of income has a statistically significant impact on 
the probability of arrears and risk of over-indebtedness. The results indicate that higher level 
of income is associated with lower probability of arrears and over-indebtedness. The first 
income quintile is the reference group, among which the probability of arrears is the highest. 
The probability of arrears decreases the higher the income quintile, while the risk of over-
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indebtedness persists between the two lowest income quintiles. As discussed before, this 
phenomenon may possibly be due to the households in the two lowest income quintiles tend 
to be struggling to make ends meet and if they are indebted, the costs of their credit 
commitments tend to be high and the repayment of it may cause heavy burden to the 
household. One suggestion is that over-commitment is more frequent in the second income 
quintile and the costs of it outweigh the impact of better liquidity situation. The negative 
impact on the risk of over-indebtedness of the three highest income quintiles is statistically 
significant and increasing.  
 
The probit models indicate that age impacts the probability of arrears and over-indebtedness. 
The LCH predicts that indebtedness is highest among the youngest age groups and begins to 
decline towards retirement. Literature associates young age also with more carefree attitude 
towards one’s liabilities that causes over-consumption and financial difficulties. The probit 
results however do not support the assumption that young age per se increases the risk of 
over-indebtedness. The reference group in probit estimation is the youngest age group and the 
results indicate in fact that the probability of arrears and over-indebtedness is statistically 
significantly higher among the age groups of 36–60. The sign of the coefficient indicates that 
belonging to the oldest group could decrease the probability of arrears and over-indebtedness, 
however the impact is not statistically significant. These results imply that the impact of age 
on the risk of arrears and over-indebtedness does not differ between the two youngest and the 
oldest group. The results suggest that the increased rate of arrears and over-indebtedness 
among young households is due to their low income and relatively high commitments. 
Younger people have also lower levels of education and financial literacy, which increase the 
rate of arrears and risk of over-indebtedness among the group. 
 
Marital status does not seem to have an independent impact on the probability of arrears or 
over-indebtedness among Finnish households. The results do not indicate any statistically 
significant differences in the probabilities between married as the reference group and 
divorced or separated, widowed or the ones never married. Divorce and separation were 
hypothesized to be a major cause of income shocks, while the interest was to test whether 
they have an independent impact on over-indebtedness. After controlling for income levels, 
any independent impact cannot be perceived. Literature also suggests that having dependent 
children increases households’ expenses and makes a large proportion of them fixed, 
increasing their vulnerability to over-indebtedness. The probit estimation results however do 
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not show any statistically significant impact on over-indebtedness after controlling for other 
factors including the level of income. Finnish households benefit from the generous social 
welfare system that supports households with children and low-income in particular, which 
reduces their risk of over-indebtedness. An interesting aspect for the following section is to 
observe if there are differences between the two Nordic welfare states and the UK.  
 
The results indicate that households’ tenure status has a statistically significant impact on the 
probability of arrears and over-indebtedness, even after controlling for income levels. The 
impact of living in rented accommodation is statistically significant and the results indicate 
that of all tenure types, tenants are associated with the highest risk of over-indebtedness. The 
risk among households living rent-free does not differ statistically from the risk of outright 
owners as a reference group, among which the risk of over-indebtedness is the lowest. The 
results show that the risk of arrears and over-indebtedness is also increased among households 
that have mortgage, in comparison to the outright owners group. The estimation results show 
a smaller difference between the groups of households that have mortgage or live in rented 
accommodation than the descriptive statistics reported previously in the Table 7. The probit 
estimation results show more or less the individual impact of tenure status on the risk of 
arrears and over-indebtedness, while the statistics in Table 7 do not control for other factors. 
Households that have mortgage tend to have higher levels of income than households living 
in rented accommodation and the results indicate that major part of the risk of tenants is due 
to their low level of income. The dummy variable of other loan commitments also captures 
the impact of higher debt exposure. The variable shows a strong and statistically significant 
positive impact on the risk of arrears and over-indebtedness and the results indicate that 
having consumer credit increases households’ risk of over-indebtedness considerably. 
 
The estimation results show that unemployment is associated with a higher risk of over-
indebtedness. The probability of arrears and over-indebtedness is significantly higher among 
unemployed than among employed as the reference group. Unemployed individuals have 
typically faced an adverse income shock and are struggling to maintain their standard of 
living with a lower level of income. Unemployment also makes smoothing income volatility 
more difficult due to lenders are reluctant to grant credit to unemployed individuals with 
reasonable costs. To avoid increasing arrears or payment defaults to the last, unemployed 
individuals might thus resort to high-cost credit such as instant loans, while hoping for that 
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they will find employment and their financial situation will improve shortly11. The impact of 
unemployment is statistically significant even after controlling for the level of income, which 
indicates that unemployment has an independent impact on over-indebtedness. The difference 
on probabilities between employed and either the other inactive group or students is not 
statistically significant, even though the rate of arrears among these two groups was increased 
based on the statistic reported earlier in Table 8. The higher likelihood of arrears could be 
explained with the low levels of income amonf students and the other inactive group. Students 
also tend to live in rented accommodation, which based on the results presented earlier is also 
associated with higher risk of arrears and over-indebtedness. Being retired on the other hand 
has a statistically significant negative impact on the probability of arrears, however the impact 
on the risk of over-indebtedness is not statistically significant and can be judged being as 
common as among the employed.  
 
The probit estimations support the findings that higher level of education decreases the risk of 
over-indebtedness. The estimation results show a negative and statistically significant impact 
of education on both the probability of arrears and over-indebtedness even after controlling 
for other factors including income. Individuals with only basic education have the highest risk 
of over-indebtedness and the risk decreases with the level of education. Some of the impact of 
education can possibly be explained with its relation to financial literacy and behavioral 
phenomena. Lusardi et al. (2017) show that financial literacy increases with the level of 
education due to individuals with higher levels of education have better incentives to invest in 
it. Individuals with tertiary education have the largest variation of lifetime income and benefit 
the most from consumption smoothing. Financial ignorance may be optimal for individuals 
with lowest levels of education, which results in weaker financial skills and higher risk of 
over-indebtedness. (Lusardi et al. 2017, 472–473.) Education increases financial 
understanding and the incentives to invest in it, which can also diminish the impact of 
behavioral biases on financial decision-making, as the individuals are more sophisticated and 
aware of their self-control problems. It could be assumed that increasing understanding of 
financial concepts should replace their likelihood of using rules of thumb in financial 
decision-making. 
 
                                                
11 This type of findings are also reported by for example Disney et al. (2008, 32) regarding UK 
households 
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The estimation results show evidence in favor of the ability to pay theory. The results indicate 
that a significant part of the risk of over-indebtedness is due to illiquidity issues caused by 
low level of income or relatively high level of expenses. Factors indicating relatively higher 
financial burden such as living in rented accommodation, having mortgage or other loan 
commitments have all a significant impact on the risk of over-indebtedness. In order to study 
the relevance of the negative equity theory, or more precisely the relevance of the dual 
trigger, the data should have included more information about households’ debt to asset 
positions and changes in housing prices in particular. Including data on households’ debt and 
asset positions would be an interesting aspect for further research, since it would provide a 
more complete picture of households’ over-indebtedness. Gerlach-Kristen & Lyons (2017) for 
example find results that support the relevance of the dual trigger among European 
households and particularly in explaining long-term arrears. They find that arrears correlate 
with the interaction of house price decline, the years of ownership and an income decline, 
while negative equity (measured with the interaction of house price decline and the 
outstanding amount of mortgage) does not have an impact on arrears. (Gerlach-Kristen & 
Lyons 2017, 13–16.) Estimating the impact of the dual trigger could also provide indications 
of the severity of financial difficulties. As it was presented in the section 3.3, the dual-trigger 
of affordability issues and negative equity could drive households to long-term arrears and 
increase the rate of mortgage defaults in the economy.  
 
The probit model does not show significant differences on HIA or HAROI between men and 
women. The results are interpreted that women and men have statistically equal probability of 
living in a household that is in arrears or at risk of over-indebtedness. The estimation method 
is not able to capture any impact on sex on the risk of over-indebtedness due household level 
arrears cannot be indicated to a specific household member. The different risks of men and 
women could be estimated from official registered payment defaults, the majority of which 
are registered to one household member that has made the commitment in question. Possible 
standpoint could have also been to estimate individually the probability of households with 
only one member, which could have indicated whether the risk of over-indebtedness is higher 
among single women than men. Useful information could have also been accomplished by 
first identifying the “head of household” and then analyzing if it has an impact on the risk of 
over-indebtedness whether this member of the household is male or female. 
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5.3 Comparative study 
 
The following section compares the levels and determinants of over-indebtedness among 
Finnish, Swedish and British households. The research utilizes cross-sectional EU-SILC data 
from 2015, which includes 14 250 Swedish and 21 231 British households, will be used for 
the estimations.  The findings are also compared to the ones of Fondeville et al. (2010) 
conducted with the EU-SILC 2008 special module data that includes also more specific data 
on household’s debt commitments. Fondeville et al. (2010) study the accumulation of 
consumer credit and its impacts on financial difficulties and identify the types of households 
that are at risk of over-indebtedness.  
 
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 11 presents statistics of the proportion of households in arrears and at risk of over-
indebtedness in Sweden, the UK and Finland. The statistics show that arrears are least 
common among Swedish and most common among Finnish households. Arrears were almost 
as common among British households as Finnish, while of Swedish households less than 4 % 
reported arrears. The risk of over-indebtedness was also the lowest among Swedish 
households of which less than one percent fulfilled the four criteria of HAROI. The risk was 
highest among British households as almost 4 % of them fulfilled the criteria, which is almost 
twice the proportion than among Finnish. Even though the proportion of households in arrears 
is highest in Finland, financial difficulties tend to be more severe among British households. 
Almost half of British households in arrears fulfilled all criteria of HAROI, while the 
proportion was only one fifth among Finnish households in arrears.  
 
Table 11: Financial difficulties in Sweden, UK and Finland  
Indicator SE (%) UK (%) FI (%) 
Arrears on mortgage or rent 1.6 3.6 3.8 
Arrears on utility bills 2.4 6.9 6.2 
Arrears on other loans 1.9 2.9 3.2 
HIA (total) 3.8 8.5 8.8 
HAROI 0.9 3.9 2.0 
 
Arrears on utility bills were the most common in all three countries. In Sweden the 
differences between the three types of were the smallest, indicating that different types of 
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arrears are more piled up to the same households. The statistics presented in Table 11 show 
similar results as the EU-SILC 2008 special module of over-indebtedness that studied over-
indebtedness with more specific data that included data of also the amount and types of credit 
commitments. Since 2008, the rate of arrears has diminished in Finland and Sweden, while in 
the UK arrears had developed to the opposite direction. In 2008, at the beginning of the 
financial crisis, the rate of arrears was higher in Finland (by 0.6 %-points) and Sweden (by 
1.6 %-points), while in the UK the arrears were lower than in 2015 (by 1.4 %-points). 
(Fondeville et al. 2010, 22.)  
 
The Table 12 presents statistics of arrears among households by their employment status. 
Arrears among employed were the most common in Finland (8 %), while the proportion was 
6 % in the UK and less than 4 % in Sweden. Unemployment has similar impact on the 
likelihood of arrears in all countries compared. The rate of arrears among unemployed was 
significantly increased in the UK, where 22 % of unemployed were in arrears. In Sweden 
where arrears are significantly less common, as high as 15 % of unemployed were in arrears. 
In Sweden and the UK, alike in Finland, another group with high rate of arrears seems to be 
the other group outside the labor market. In all three countries arrears were significantly less 
common among retired. 
 
Table 12: Arrears per employment status 
Employment status HIA (%) 
SE UK FI 
Employed 3.6 6.0 8.2 
Unemployed 14.7 21.8 18.3 
Student 6.9 9.9 10.4 
Retired 1.2 1.2 1.8 
Other  12.9 18.8 13.5 
 
Table 13 summarizes the proportions of households in arrears and at risk of over-indebtedness 
by income quintiles. The statistics indicate that higher level of income is associated with 
lower probability of arrears and over-indebtedness evidently in all three countries. However, 
financial difficulties seem to be distributed more evenly between income groups in Finland 
than in Sweden or the UK, where financial difficulties are more strongly associated with 
belonging to the two lowest income quintiles.  
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Table 13: HIA and HAROI by income quintiles 
Income quintiles HIA (%) HAROI (%) 
SE UK FI SE UK FI 
1st 9.4 14.6 12.9 3.0 8.1 3.9 
2nd 5.3 10.3 10.9 1.8 5.0 4.0 
3rd 2.4 5.7 7.3 0.4 2.7 2.1 
4th 0.9 3.4 5.7 0.1 0.7 1.0 
5th 1.3 1.2 2.6 0 0.3 0.3 
 
In the UK and Sweden, the risk of over-indebtedness is significantly increased among 
households in the lowest income quintile. In the UK and Finland, the risk of over-
indebtedness is twice the average among the lowest income quintile while in Sweden the risk 
is three times the average. In Finland, the risk of over-indebtedness persists between the first 
and the second income quintile, while in the UK and Sweden there is a clear difference.  
 
Households living in rented accommodation have a significantly increased risk of over-
indebtedness in all three countries studied. Table 14 presents the statistics of arrears and risk 
of over-indebtedness by household’s tenure status. The statistics show that the likelihood of 
arrears and over-indebtedness is highest among tenants and especially increased in the UK, as 
almost 17 % of them were in arrears and 9 % at risk of over-indebtedness. Tenants seem to be 
a risk group also in Sweden since the rate of arrears among tenants was almost twice the 
average. The risk of over-indebtedness among tenants in the UK seems substantial compared 
to Finland or Sweden, which may be due to Nordic social security systems are more generous 
in granting housing benefits for households in the lowest income groups.  
 
Table 14: HIA and HAROI by tenure status 
Tenure status HIA (%) HAROI (%) 
SE UK FI SE UK FI 
Outright owner 1.3 0.9 2.9 0 0.3 0.6 
Owner with mortgage 2.4 3.5 9.1 0.4 1.3 2.5 
Tenant 7.3 16.7 12.5 2.7 8.5 4.0 
Free - 4.0 8.7 - 1.4 3.8 
 
Arrears and over-indebtedness are the least likely among outright owners. In Sweden, the 
statistics in fact imply that none of outright owners were at risk of over-indebtedness and the 
proportions in the UK and Finland are also only 0.3 % and 0.6 %. Among Swedish 
households, the outright owner group accounts for only a small fraction of households and as 
large proportion as 60 % of Swedish households have mortgage. In Finland and the UK, the 
proportion of households with mortgage was approximately one third of households. In 
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Sweden or the UK mortgage seems not to impact the likelihood of over-indebtedness as much 
as it does in Finland where the difference in arrears and the risk of over-indebtedness is 
significant. The results highlight the importance of increasing systemic risk in Finland among 
households with mortgage, of which the ESRB also raised a warning. Mortgage repayment 
culture between Finland and Sweden differs significantly as Finnish households are expected 
to repay their mortgage completely, while Swedish households make installments mainly only 
in the beginning or the contract. This explains the high proportion of Swedish households 
with mortgage and also indicates that the levels of outstanding mortgage they have might be 
smaller. 
 
The following Table 15 presents the statistics by the two types of credit commitments 
identified from EU-SILC data, mortgage and other loan commitments. Alike in Finland, 
having consumer credit or other non-housing related loans has a similar impact on the 
likelihood of arrears and being at risk of over-indebtedness in Sweden and the UK. Almost 
half of surveyed households in all countries had other loan commitments. The statistics in 
Table 15 show significant differences on the rate of arrears among households with other loan 
commitments than households without. The difference is the largest among Finnish 
households as the rate of arrears was 11 percentage points higher among households with 
other loan commitments than households without, while the difference is more moderate in 
the countries compared. Approximately 4 % of Finnish and British households with other 
loan commitments and 2 % of Swedish fulfilled all criteria of HAROI, while the proportion 
was clearly lower among households without other loan commitments. 
 
Table 15: HIA and HAROI by credit commitments 
Credit commitment 
  
HIA (%) HAROI (%) 
SE UK FI SE UK FI 
Other loans No 1.4 5.3 2.5 0.3 2.7 0.6 Yes 6.6 9.4 13.5 2.1 4.3 4.0 
Mortgage No 6.0 8.8 7.2 2.1 4.4 2.1 Yes 2.1 3.5 9.1 0.3 1.3 2.5 
 
As discussed earlier, having mortgage does not impact the risk of over-indebtedness as 
strongly as having consumer credit. The EU-SILC statistics show that in fact in the UK and 
Sweden, households with mortgage tend to be less over-indebted than households without. As 
showed before, in Finland the relation is the other way around, even if the differences were 
relatively small. The results are mainly explained by the different distribution of population 
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by tenure status. 82 % of households without mortgage in Sweden are tenants, while the 
proportion is only 28 % in the UK and 21 % in Finland. Of households owning their 
accommodation only 11 % are outright owners in Sweden, while the proportion is over 40 % 
the UK and Finland. As the statistics in Table 14 show, the likelihood of over-indebtedness is 
significantly increased among tenants and the lowest among outright owners. Even though 
only a slightly higher proportion of households not having mortgage are tenants in the UK 
than in Finland, the difference in the risk of over-indebtedness is significant. The statistics in 
Table 14 indicate that tenants are a significant risk group in the UK, which can be explained 
by their relatively high financial burden of housing costs. 70 % of tenants in the UK have 
housing burden exceeding 25 % of their disposable income, which is significantly higher 
compared to 57 % in Finland. Housing burden exceeds 60 % of disposable income among 
British households living in rented accommodation, while in Finland the proportion is only 
5 %. (Eurostat 2018b.) 
 
The EU-SILC statistics presented in Table 16 show that over-indebtedness is significantly 
increased among households with dependent children evidently in all three countries. 
Households without dependent children are below average in all three countries, while single 
parents seem to be particularly vulnerable to financial difficulties.  
 
Table 16: HIA by household type 
Household type HIA (%) 
SE UK FI 
No children 3.3 3.7 5.9 
Single parent 7.1 28.8 18.1 
2 adults 4.9 9.9 10.8 
 
Almost 30 % of single parent households were in arrears in the UK, while in Finland the 
proportion was also as high as 18 % and 7 % in Sweden. The likelihood seems to be 
significantly lower among two adult households with children, however still increased in 
comparison to households without children.  
 
5.3.2 Probit estimations 
 
The following section compares the determinants of over-indebtedness between Finland, 
Sweden and the UK. HIA and HAROI probit estimation models are executed with Swedish 
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and British EU-SILC data and the estimation results of the three countries are compared. The 
HIA model explains 22.3 % of the variation on the probability of arrears in the Swedish EU-
SILC data and 25.6 % in the British data. The HAROI model explains 27.2 % of the variation 
on the risk of over-indebtedness in Swedish data and 24.1 % in British. The Wald tests of all 
four estimation models are passed and the model coefficients of determination are statistically 
significant at 5 % risk level. The estimation results are presented in the Table 17. 
 
Table 17: Probit estimation results Sweden and UK 
 VARIABLES (FI) (FI) (SE) (SE) (UK) (UK) 
 HIA HAROI HIA HAROI HIA HAROI 
Sex  
Male (Reference category) 
Female 0.0108 0.105 -0,0789 -0,143 -0,027 -0,0331 
 (0.0440) (0.0692) (0.0714) (0.125) (0.0508) (0.0672) 
Income quintiles  
1st income quintile (Reference category) 
2nd income quintile -0.201*** -0.0871 -0.404*** -0,18 -0.202*** -0.193** 
 (0.0643) (0.0865) (0.101) (0.141) (0.0630) (0.0793) 
3rd income quintile -0.546*** -0.442*** -0.757*** -0.676*** -0.329*** -0.258*** 
 (0.0705) (0.105) (0.115) (0.167) (0.0705) (0.0904) 
4th income quintile -0.724*** -0.760*** -1.163*** - -0.572*** -0.775*** 
 (0.0792) (0.135) (0.134)  (0.0899) (0.135) 5th income quintile -0.865*** -1.112*** -0.822*** - -0.759*** -0.717*** 
 (0.0822) (0.190) (0.135)  (0.125) (0.153) Age groups  
! 25 (Reference category) 
26–35 0.173* 0.148 0,0513 -0,243 -0.168* -0.248** 
 (0.0933) (0.123) (0.171) (0.297) (0.0958) (0.123) 
36–45 0.244** 0.319** 0,227 0,311 -0,0557 -0,104 
 (0.0966) (0.133) (0.175) (0.264) (0.102) (0.128) 
46–60 0.193** 0.369*** 0,251 0,287 -0,048 -0,0294 
 (0.0963) (0.135) (0.182) (0.280) (0.106) (0.136) 
>60 -0.0905 -0.234 -0.510* -0,165 -0.370** -0.385* 
 (0.156) (0.277) (0.279) (0.405) (0.160) (0.199) 
Marital status  
Married (Reference category) 
Never married 0.00866 -0.0605 0,00653 -0,0445 0,0917 0,121 
 (0.0597) (0.0941) (0.0924) (0.183) (0.0746) (0.101) 
Divorced/separated 0.0251 0.113 0,0627 0.370** 0,0863 0.275*** 
 (0.0803) (0.117) (0.111) (0.174) (0.0862) (0.106) 
Widowed -0.106 0.105 -0,268 0,384 0.257** 0.371** 
 (0.149) (0.226) (0.222) (0.347) (0.127) (0.171) 
Household type  
Adult(s) without children (Reference category) 
Single parent 0.141 0.0776 -0,142 -0,192 0.622*** 0.445*** 
 (0.0960) (0.138) (0.164) (0.231) (0.0831) (0.0975) 
2 adults with children -0.0430 0.100 0,0853 -0,162 0.227*** 0,113 
 (0.0620) (0.0932) (0.102) (0.160) (0.0727) (0.0898) 
Tenure status  
Outright owner (Reference 
category) 
(Reference 
category) 
(Reference 
category)  
(Reference 
category) 
(Reference 
category) 
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Owner paying mortgage 0.221*** 0.319*** -0,18 -0.331*** 0.291*** 0,196 
 (0.0620) (0.108) (0.183) (0.119) (0.0926) (0.121) 
Tenant 0.224*** 0.488*** 0,133 (Reference category) 0.962*** 0.914*** 
 (0.0702) (0.111) (0.179)  (0.0799) (0.102) Free 0.276 0.568* - - 0,214 0,043 
 (0.208) (0.331)   (0.338) (0.379) Consumer credit  0.935*** 0.928*** 0.877*** 1.004*** 0.516*** 0.436*** 
 (0.0562) (0.0942) (0.0930) (0.179) (0.0531) (0.0661) 
Employment status  
Employed (Reference category) 
Unemployed 0.299*** 0.321*** 0.422*** 0.735*** 0.423*** 0.422*** 
 (0.0795) (0.108) (0.149) (0.207) (0.111) (0.131) 
Student -0.131 0.0612 0,0383 0.407* -0.255** -0,176 
 (0.0861) (0.114) (0.154) (0.222) (0.105) (0.134) 
Retired -0.488*** 0.125 0.408* -0,12 -0.306** -0,234 
 (0.148) (0.300) (0.233) (0.370) (0.140) (0.168) 
Other inactive 0.0860 0.210* 0.483** 0.729*** 0.252*** 0.246*** 
 (0.0795) (0.115) (0.194) (0.275) (0.0674) (0.0846) 
Level of education  
Basic education (Reference category) 
Upper secondary -0.175*** -0.185** -0.275*** -0.561*** -0.172** -0,0836 
 (0.0604) (0.0826) (0.0930) (0.151) (0.0671) (0.0887) 
Tertiary -0.414*** -0.582*** -0.426*** -0.535*** -0.396*** -0.251*** 
 (0.0696) (0.113) (0.102) (0.172) (0.0627) (0.0808) 
       
Constant -1.619*** -2.834*** -1.574*** -2.041*** -1.961*** -2.333*** 
  (0.149) (0.225) (0.294) (0.431) (0.173) (0.227) 
       
Observations 16,132 16,128 7,417 3,973 11,521 11,523 
Pseudo R2 0.1990 0.2119 0.2229 0.2724 0.2555 0.2407 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results in Table 17 reveal a shortcoming of the probit estimation regarding the Swedish 
HAROI probit estimation. The estimation drops out significant number of the observations 
that belong to the three explanatory variables, the fourth and the fifth income quintiles and the 
outright owner group, that are left outside of the estimation. These variables predict the failure 
(HAROI = 0) perfectly and the variables are automatically left outside of the estimation, since 
the estimated coefficient would have been infinite. None of the observations among the fifth 
income quintile or the outright owners group in the estimation data fulfill the criteria of 
HAROI. Among the 4th income quintile, only 0.1 % of the observations fulfill the criteria of 
HAROI but these deviant observations are dropped out of the estimation due to missing 
values in some of the other independent variables. The estimation results raise a question of 
the reliability of the data set in use, or if the criteria for risk of over-indebtedness are too strict 
to describe debt issues among high-income Swedish households. These results suggest that in 
Sweden the risk of over-indebtedness would be non-existent among the two highest income 
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groups and the outright owners, however no such conclusions can be made based on these 
results. There probably would be a more appropriate approach to describe the debt issues 
among the highest income quintiles in Sweden. The estimation could be most likely more 
accurately performed, if the data included more information about household’s debt exposure. 
Debt to assets or debt servicing to income ratios could give a better picture of the risks of 
over-indebting also among the highest income groups. 
 
The probit estimation results are for the main parts similar with Swedish and British data as 
were presented in the previous chapter with Finnish data. The estimation results support the 
ability-to-pay theory and show that affordability issues are a major driver of arrears and over-
indebtedness. The level of income has a statistically significant negative impact on the risk of 
over-indebtedness in all three countries studied. The results of HIA estimation are 
straightforward in all three countries and the probability of arrears declines the higher the 
income quintile. The UK HAROI results show that income level has a statistically significant 
negative impact on the risk of over-indebtedness, which declines steadily from the first till the 
fourth income quintile. However, the risk of over-indebtedness is less decreased among the 
fifth income quintile than the fourth, which might be due to the levels of debt can be 
substantial among the fifth income quintile. The SE HAROI estimation is performed 
considering only the three lowest income quintiles, since none of the observations in fourth 
and fifth income quintiles fulfill the criteria of HAROI.  These results also imply a 
statistically significant decreasing impact of income level to the risk of over-indebtedness and 
support the relevance of affordability issues in explaining over-indebtedness in Sweden.  
Unlike among Finnish households, there is a clear difference on the risk of over-indebtedness 
between the two lowest income quintiles among Swedish and British households.  
 
The probit estimation results show that age does not have a statistically significant impact on 
the risk of arrears or over-indebtedness among Swedish households after controlling for other 
factors. The results show a negative impact on the risk of over-indebtedness and arrears for 
the oldest age group, however the results are statistically insignificant. In the UK, the 
estimation results indicate a negative impact of age on the probability of arrears and the risk 
of over-indebtedness, however the estimation results are not statistically significant except for 
the oldest group in HIA model and the second youngest group in HAROI model. The results 
of UK estimations are more in line with the LCH, according to which the risk of over-
indebtedness is increased among the youngest households due to their higher demand for debt 
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for consumption smoothing purposes. Belonging to the oldest age group has a statistically 
significant negative impact on the probability of arrears, but the impact on the risk of over-
indebtedness is statistically insignificant. The UK HAROI results show that somewhat 
surprisingly that the risk of over-indebtedness is the lowest among the age group 26 to 35 
years.  
 
The reference group being the married group, the results show a statistically significant 
positive impact on the risk of over-indebtedness among divorced or separated in Sweden and 
the UK, while the impact on the probability arrears is not statistically significant. The results 
differ from the ones received for Finnish households, among which marital status was not a 
predictor of over-indebtedness. Divorce and separation are major causes of adverse income 
shocks and increase the risk of over-indebtedness particularly since divorced or separated 
attempt to keep their standard of living with lower disposable income. The risk among 
divorced or separated persists even after controlling for income levels, which indicates that 
divorcing or separation may also have psychic costs that affect the management of household 
finances and also impact borrowing opportunities. In the UK the risk is also increased also 
among widowed that in addition to an adverse income shock, causes sorrow and has 
psychological costs that may hinder the ability to manage household finances. The different 
impacts between the UK and the two Nordic welfare countries may be due to the different 
levels of social security widows are entitled to.  
 
The probit estimation results support the earlier observation that having dependent children is 
a major driver of over-indebtedness in the UK. The UK results show that the probability of 
arrears is the highest among single parent households, while the risk among two parent 
households does not differ statistically from the risk of households without children. Neither 
FI nor SE probit estimation results show statistically significant impact of having children on 
the risk of over-indebtedness. The difference is most likely due to the Nordic social security 
system gives generous support particularly low-income families with children.  
 
The estimation results show that tenure status impacts the risk of over-indebtedness in all 
three countries studied. In Finland and the UK, having mortgage or living in rented 
accommodation increases household’s probability of arrears compared to outright owners as 
the reference group while tenure status is not a predictor of arrears among Swedish 
households. Living in rented accommodation is associated with a higher risk of over-
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indebtedness evidently in all countries studied. The SE HAROI estimation is executed 
considering only two groups – tenants and owners with mortgage – due to the outright owners 
group is dropped out of the estimation because none of the observations fulfill the criteria of 
HAROI (and the free category has no observations). Tenants are considered as the reference 
group in the SE HAROI estimation and based on the results, their risk of over-indebtedness is 
increased compared to households with mortgage. Having mortgage does not seem to increase 
the risk of over-indebtedness in the UK HAROI estimation, unlike shown with the FI 
estimation. In comparison to Swedish households particularly, Finnish households are obliged 
to repay their mortgage completely, and the installments of it may also cause substantial 
burden to the household. The dummy variable of having other loan commitments has a 
statistically significant impact on the risk of arrears and over-indebtedness in all three 
countries studied. Even though mortgage forms the major part of household credit, decisions 
related to mortgage are typically more deliberate while accumulation of consumer credit may 
be result of careless or shortsighted behavior. Repayment of consumer credit increases 
household’s financial burden, especially if the borrowing decision is done without much 
consideration since the interest and costs of instant credit particularly may be substantial.  
 
Unemployment has a statistically significant positive impact on the probability of arrears and 
over-indebtedness in all countries studied. In Sweden and the UK, a similar impact is shown 
for also other inactive groups that are outside of the labor market, which differs from the 
results found with Finnish data. The HIA results show that alike in Finland, the probability of 
arrears is decreased among pensioners in the UK, while the impact is not statistically 
significant considering HAROI. In Sweden, the risk of over-indebtedness among pensioners 
is statistically the same as among employed. The UK data also shows a statistically significant 
negative impact on the probability of arrears among students.  
 
The probit estimation results support the earlier suggestion that the level of education impacts 
the risk of over-indebtedness in all three countries. The impact of higher education level is 
statistically significant even after controlling for the level of income and the impact is the 
stronger the higher the level of education. The impact of education on the risk of over-
indebtedness on the other hand is not as straightforward among Swedish or British households 
as it was among Finnish households. The results show that among Swedish households the 
impact of education on the risk of over-indebtedness is approximately the same between the 
ones with upper secondary or tertiary education. In the UK on the other hand the risk of over-
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indebtedness is only decreased among the ones with tertiary education, and the impact of 
upper secondary education is not statistically significant. These results confirm the 
importance of financial education on the risk of over-indebtedness.  
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6 RESULTS AND POLICY MEASURES 
 
 
The following chapter draws conclusions of the analysis performed in the previous chapter. 
The first section presents the risk groups of over-indebtedness that are identifiable from the 
EU-SILC data and discusses the determinants that trigger over-indebtedness among risk 
groups. In the second section 6.2 the policy measures targeted to alleviate household over-
indebtedness are presented and evaluated. Future development of policy measures is also 
discussed.  
 
6.1 Risk groups of over-indebtedness 
 
This study finds strong evidence to support the importance of the risk factors of over-
indebtedness12 identified in previous literature13, which were presented in chapter 4.1. The 
risk groups of over-indebtedness identified from Finnish EU-SILC can be characterized with 
these risk factors and the factors seem to have a cumulative impact on the risk of over-
indebtedness.   
 
The impact of the first risk factor, young age, is not as straightforward among Finnish 
households as described by previous literature. The statistics show that approximately 11.5 % 
of people aged under 46 live in households with arrears, while the proportion is a bit lower 
among the ones aged 46–60 and significantly lower among the ones aged 60 and over. The 
probit results confirm that after controlling for other factors, the risk of over-indebtedness is 
not increased due to young age per se, in fact the ones aged 0–35 have the second lowest risk 
of arrears and over-indebtedness after the oldest age group. Youngest individuals cannot thus 
be unambiguously identified as a risk group of over-indebtedness. Young households do, 
however, typically fulfill several other risk factors that have a statistically significant impact 
on over-indebtedness: they tend to have low levels of income and either live in rented 
accommodation or have substantial amount of mortgage compared to their current level of 
income. 
                                                
12 (1) Young age, (2) low income, (3) unemployment, having (4) dependent children or (5) only one adult provider, (6) being 
divorced or separated, (7) living in rented accommodation, (8) having multiple credit commitments, (9) facing unexpected 
income shocks and (10) having a neglectful attitude towards paying one’s commitments. 
13 See, for example Berthoud & Kempson 1992, Herbert & Kempson 1995, Webley & Nyhus 2001, Betti et al. 2007 
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The results show evidence that low income is a significant risk factor of over-indebtedness 
among Finnish households. Households belonging to the two lowest income quintiles are 
identified as a major risk group of over-indebtedness. The percentage of low-income 
households at risk of over-indebtedness is twice the average and their vulnerability to over-
indebtedness is especially increased if they fulfill also other risk factors such as being 
unemployed. The impact of unemployment on the risk of over-indebtedness persists even 
after controlling for other factors including the level of income. In addition to having low 
levels of income, unemployed struggle to smooth their consumption due to difficulties in 
getting new credit. In order to smooth the income volatility, they may need to resort to high 
cost credit. Prolonged unemployment has also psychic costs that may hinder the capability to 
manage household finances. Unemployment and over-indebtedness cause an employment trap 
that may push household to long-standing poverty and social exclusion. It might not be 
profitable for them to improve their income level since debt enforcement begins as soon as 
they begin to receive income that can be garnished. Other groups based on economic statuses 
are students and other inactive people outside the labor market. Neither being student nor 
belonging to the other group has an independent impact on over-indebtedness, but they do 
have increased levels of arrears. The increased risk of financial difficulties among these 
groups is most likely mainly due to low level of income and that they typically live in rented 
accommodation.  
 
The Finnish EU-SILC confirms that tenants are a risk group of over-indebtedness. Statistics 
in Table 7 show that tenants are particularly burdened by housing costs and like students they 
typically have low levels of income. Tenants typically also have less wealth, thus if they hold 
debt, their debt to asset ratios are high. Statistics also identify households that live rent-free or 
with reduced rent as a risk group of over-indebtedness, even if they are not burdened by 
housing costs. These households typically include families with dependent children, 
unemployed or other people outside of the labor market, which fulfill several other risk 
factors of over-indebtedness. Households with dependent children can also be identified as a 
risk group of over-indebtedness due to their likelihood of arrears is significantly increased 
compared to households without children. The probit results however do not show any 
independent impact of having children thus the increased risk of households with children is 
due to other factors including low level of income particularly in single parent households and 
higher levels of debt. The EU-SILC survey does not collect data on the number of credit 
commitments or amount borrowed, however the results show that the types of credit 
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identifiable form the survey – mortgage and other credit commitments – increase households’ 
risk of over-indebtedness. Mortgage in particular increases household’s financial burden, 
since it forms the major part of household credit. Other loan commitments on the other hand 
include also high cost consumer credit that is typically combined with other risk factors such 
as low income or unemployment.  
 
The Finnish EU-SILC also identifies that people with only basic education are a risk group of 
over-indebtedness. The probability of arrears is also increased among the ones with upper 
secondary education. The impact however is probably due to their higher credit exposure, 
since upper secondary education itself has a decreasing impact on arrears and over-
indebtedness. Individuals with low levels of education tend to lack financial knowledge and 
be more prone to behavioral biases, which hinder their possibilities to make sustainable 
financial decisions. 
 
6.2 Policy measures 
 
Policy measures intended to tackle over-indebtedness can be divided into preventive and 
curative measures. The former attempt to influence the supply and demand sides of credit 
markets, while the latter are intended to respond to default situations. Preventive measures on 
the demand side consist of financial education, financial and debt counseling and 
precautionary warning of the consequences of payment delinquencies or defaults. 
Precautionary warning can prevent consumers from adopting careless behavior but requires 
that the consequences are anticipatorily communicated and that the level of penalties issued is 
sustainable and does not impose debtors to critical financial difficulties. (Anderloni & 
Vandone 2010, 6, 9–11.) Precautionary warning may have negligible impact on the behavior 
of the risk groups, since they are the most likely to be impacted by behavioral biases and 
underestimate their risk of over-indebtedness. 
 
Financial education attempts to promote responsible borrowing behavior and understanding 
of financial information but also to impact the psychological patterns in financial decision-
making by endorsing preparing for adverse shocks with precautionary saving or insurance 
solutions. (Anderloni & Vandone 2011, 6, 9–11.) Increasing the level of financial knowledge 
with educational programs has been seen as an obvious cure for debt problems. Fernandes et 
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al. (2014) however show that even substantial educational programs have negligible effects 
on behavior after couple of years, due to financial knowledge has little impact on decisions 
controlled by emotions, such as compulsive buying. Financial education should instead 
promote propensity to plan and proactivity in managing household finances and teach pre-
commitments tools that restrict spending opportunities and diminish the impact of lacking 
self-control. Teaching financial knowledge should be focused only on “just-in-time” financial 
advising that is connected to a particular financial decision. (Fernandez et al. 2014, 1873–
1874.) Angulo-Ruiz and Pergelova (2015, 569–571) however acknowledge that the schooling 
system has an important role in developing responsible financial behavior, particularly for 
young consumers whose parents do not have adequate financial knowledge. They show that 
financial knowledge is heavily affected by the examples of money-management skills they 
get from their parents and poor examples can even outweigh some knowledge acquired via 
financial education, particularly in low-income households. 
 
There are currently several initiatives attempting to impact the level of financial knowledge in 
Finland. Financial education is more integrated to the national curriculum and the 
development of it will be monitored with the PISA Tests of financial skills, in which Finland 
took part for the first time in 2018. The Deaconess Institute and few banks operating in 
Finland are also organizing another major financial skills initiative (Taloustaitohanke) that 
aims at improving the financial skills of young individuals that are struggling with money-
management and are at high risk of social exclusion. In addition to teaching financial 
knowledge, the initiative aims at strengthening the feeling of control and improving young 
consumers’ motivation on financial management, which in the light of Angulo-Ruiz and 
Pergelova (2015) is the most effective way to impact financial behavior. Households 
struggling with money-management are also offered financial and debt counseling provided 
by Finnish municipalities, which however acts rather as a curative measure than preventive 
one, since people tend to seek help only when they are already over-indebted. (Peura-
Kapanen et al. 2015, 69.) Improving financial skills throughout the lifecycle is important 
since the impact of financial education is not lasting and would be most effective occurring 
simultaneously with financial decision-making. Financial education should be taught all the 
way from primary school until the end of secondary school to ensure that financial knowledge 
and propensity to financial planning of young consumers are at adequate level. Universal 
financial education would even out the differences in financial literacy caused by different 
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backgrounds and alleviate the risk of over-indebtedness that is increased among certain 
groups. 
 
On the supply side preventive measures consist of legal measures to limit irresponsible 
lending: mandatory transparency of loan terms and conditions that enables responsible 
borrowing, appropriate credit scoring procedures to ensure responsible lending and special 
measures such as rate ceilings for consumer credit. (Anderloni & Vandone 2010, 6, 10–11.) 
Legislative restrictions and the supervision of Financial Supervisory Authority (FIN-FSA) 
limit credit supply and protect the macro stability of the economy, since institutions under 
their supervision lend majority of household debt. Current macroprudential tools focus on 
controlling over-indebtedness particularly by restricting the loan-to-value ratios of mortgage. 
New controls however need to be introduced to safeguard the economy, since according to 
Bank of Finland, the risks of household indebtedness are increasingly due to commercial and 
housing company loans. (Nykänen 2018.)  
 
Legislative reform was implemented in 2013 to restrict the supply of instant loans that are 
major triggers of debt problems. An interest rate cap of 50 % was mandated for credit 
contracts with nominal values below 2,000 euros and the marketing of instant credit was 
restricted. Majamaa et al. (2016) find that the legislative reform has succeeded in restricting 
the instant credit supply and diminished the number of people with problematic instant debt, 
especially among the youngest age group. One side effect however is that the supply of 
instant credit outside of the scope of the legislative reform, i.e. credit contracts above 2,000 
including also credit limits, has increased. Majamaa et al. (2017) show that as a consequence 
the levels of problem debt over-indebted individuals hold has increased to significantly higher 
level. As a response, the Ministry of Justice has prepared a proposal for new legislative 
reform to the Finnish Parliament, which would bring also credit contracts above 2,000 euros 
to the scope of the rate cap and tighter the consequences of violating the rate cap requirement. 
(Ministry of Justice 2018.)  
 
Responsible lending requires adequate information of borrower’s repayment capabilities, past 
repayment history and overall debt exposure. By collecting payment defaults, current credit 
registers safeguard lenders from credit losses and prevent further over-indebtedness. Lenders 
however have to rely on the information provided by borrowers when it comes to the overall 
debt exposure. Authorities and financial actors are calling for establishing a positive credit 
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register that would collect information of debtors’ all credit commitments and give more 
adequate understanding of their financial situation. Positive credit register would promote 
responsible lending, prevent over-commitment and cut short debt cycling that in most cases 
worsens household’s financial situation. Lenders should comply with the ethics of lending 
and ignoring the information given of the debt exposure would transfer more responsibility to 
the lenders that currently are willing to lend high-cost credit to already over-indebted 
individuals. Positive credit register would also facilitate these households that already have 
multiple credit commitments in understanding the extent of their debt exposure. In today’s 
society, where indebtedness is an increasing concern that has the potential of triggering 
financial crisis, preventing defaulting and over-indebtedness should be a vital part of 
corporate responsibility. Consumers need to be encouraged to contact their creditors at the 
earliest point they notice they are struggling with money-management and creditors should 
feel responsibility to guide them to seek financial advice. 
 
Curative measures consist of legislative measures restricting debt collection, debt 
management and restructuring schemes such as restructuring loans, arranged payment 
schedules or settlement procedures. Curative measures attempt to prevent over-indebted 
households from further indebtedness and alleviate the impact of adverse negative shocks to 
protect over-indebted households from poverty and social exclusion. (Anderloni & Vandone 
2010, 6.) Peura-Kapanen et al. (2015, 56) assess that policy measures in use in Finland are 
rather curative than preventive, while preventive measures would need to be strengthened in 
order to avoid increasing of debt problems.  
 
Debt restructuring is last resort means for long-term over-indebtedness. It is initiated by 
district court if debtor has been verified insolvent, has attempted to reach agreement with 
lenders, the debt is not payable without restructuring and insolvency is primarily not caused 
by debtor’s own irresponsible behavior. Debt restructuring cannot be granted if it is caused by 
careless borrowing or repayment behavior or if the debt has been formed as a consequence of 
a crime. The court can assess that debt restructuring can be granted despite these factors if it 
considers that there are substantial reasons in favor of granting debt restructuring. The court 
can assess that the significance of the default is smaller to the lenders than the significance of 
overcoming debt problems is to the debtor. The court can also consider that if debtor has 
attempted to repay debt or the debt is very old as factors in favor of granting debt 
restructuring. Debtors will be mandated to follow a repayment schedule that typically lasts 
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five years, after which the remaining debt is remitted. (KKV.) Debt restructuring can be a 
very effective curative measure, but it cannot eliminate the reasons behind over-indebtedness. 
Debtors applying for debt restructuring are typically unemployed and have very low levels of 
income and education and Fredriksson (2014) shows that as many as 40 % of them ended up 
under debt enforcement the same year as their restructuring scheme ended. To alleviate the 
impact of unemployment trap, Peura-Kapanen et al. (2015, 55) propose giving debtors a 
couple months free from debt enforcement when becoming employed in order to get 
household finances sorted out.  
 
Rational and foresighted consumers cover unexpected expenses with precautionary saving or 
with credit the amount and interest of which is based on a careful assessment of their 
repayment capacity. Promoted by digitalization and new innovations – instant – is becoming 
the new normal also in borrowing. Consumers are offered credit as fast as within 24 hours, 
which promotes irresponsible borrowing as decisions can be made with little to no 
consideration. Preventing the hazardous development, Peura-Kapanen et al. (2015) support 
increasing the supply of social lending that currently works only as a curative measure, even 
if its potential is in preventing over-indebtedness. Social lending is granted to low-income 
households that do not have possibilities to borrow from the market with reasonable costs. 
Social lending is an optional service provided by Finnish communities and it is granted to for 
example getting household finances in order and breaking debt cycles or for furthering 
rehabilitation or employment. Social small loans could replace some of the need for instant 
credit and would result in lower costs of debt restructuring and other costly forms of curative 
measures. (Peura-Kapanen et al. 2015.) Restructuring loans are another important curative 
measure with which household’s outstanding loans will be aggregated into one commitment 
that is guaranteed by the Finnish Guarantee Foundation. Debtors need to be assessed capable 
to repay the restructuring loan, and guarantee is thus not granted to all over-indebted 
households. Other actors have acknowledged the demand for aggregated loans to over-
indebted households. These loans have high costs and long repayment periods, which might 
further worsen the financial situation of an already over-indebted household. Defaulting 
instead would cut short further indebting and repayment of debt with more reasonable costs 
and interest via debt enforcement. (Guarantee Foundation 2018.) 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This study forms a comprehensive description of the risk groups of over-indebtedness in 
Finland. The study supports the findings of previous studies and determines socio-economic 
characteristics that impose households to the risk of over-indebtedness. Understanding the 
multidimensional causes of over-indebtedness is vital in order to adjust the policy measures 
correctly. Diverse set of tools is required to alleviate the consequences that over-indebtedness 
has on the well-being of individuals and the social and economic stability of the society.  
 
The research concludes that adverse income shocks or unexpected expenses are one of the 
most important individual triggers of payment defaults. Adverse shocks are due to for 
example unemployment and trigger over-indebtedness as household is no longer able to keep 
the acquired consumption level or is not able to smooth the income fluctuation due to 
liquidity constraints. As previous literature finds, households tend to have bounded rationality 
due to which they are inadequately prepared for adverse shocks. Liquidity constrained 
households may be forced to borrow with high costs in order to avoid defaulting on their 
existing commitments. Lack of financial literacy leads to suboptimal borrowing decisions and 
worsens the already financially difficult situation. As Hyytinen and Putkuri (2018) show, the 
same households that seem the most incapable of forming rational expectations of their 
financial situation also experience the largest income declines.  
 
However, also households that have not faced any adverse economic shocks become over-
indebted. Households belonging to the lowest socio-economic groups are at the risk of over-
indebtedness due to they are struggling to make ends meet with current resources and are 
constantly living beyond their means. Their necessary living expenses are relatively high due 
to they typically live in rented accommodation, while other factors including dependent 
children increase their risk even further by making major part of household expenses fixed. 
Households belonging to the lowest socio-economic groups must resort to high-cost credit to 
smooth consumption due to their low creditworthiness. These households may pile up instant 
credit commitments that have high APRs and short maturity periods, which triggers arrears 
and may result in payment defaults. Over-commitment is a trigger of debt problems also 
among wealthier households. Compulsive buying and lack of self-control may lead to over-
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commitment, which increases the risk of over-indebtedness especially if consumption is 
financed with multiple credit commitments. Optimist financial expectations and behavioral 
heuristics play their part in increasing the number of credit commitments household has and 
clouds their perception of debt exposure. Irresponsible lending further increases over-
commitment with aggressive marketing and instant credit being constantly available. 
Financial difficulties become severe as soon as household needs to resort to new credit to pay-
off old ones. 
 
Preventing young households from becoming over-indebted is particularly important since 
due to their low levels of income and wealth, payment defaults may become a long-standing 
problem that may have severe consequences and lead to social exclusion and poverty. 
Payment defaults also often make it difficult to get rental apartments and restrict 
precautionary saving and the ability to accumulate wealth. To prevent over-indebtedness of 
young households, financial education plays a major role particularly for those from the 
lowest socio-economic groups. This study finds evidence supporting the importance of 
education in restricting the risk of over-indebtedness. Households with low levels of 
education tend to make sub-optimal financial decisions and be prone to behavioral biases such 
as myopia or using rules of thumb. Financial planning and precautionary saving should 
belong to the skills taught universally in comprehensive school. Impulsivity and inexperience 
in financial decision-making may tempt young households to make unconsidered decisions 
when exposed to aggressive marketing of instant credit. Further legislative restrictions are 
required to limit the supply of high-cost instant credit in order to protect young households 
and financially struggling households from worsening of financial distress. There is also an 
urgent need to develop credit products such as social small loans to substitute high-cost credit 
that triggers debt problems in order to alleviate the financial struggles of liquidity constrained 
households. Repaying high-cost credit will worsen the financial difficulties of households that 
need to resort to it when there are no other options available. Social lending has potential to 
significantly decrease the costs of debt enforcement and restructuring, which is why it should 
be easily available and marketed as a better option to alternative high-cost credit. 
 
Loan-to-value ratios are an efficient tool in restricting household indebtedness related to 
mortgage. Mortgage forms the largest part of household credit, while the risk of over-
indebtedness is particularly increased when households supplement mortgage with secured or 
unsecured consumer credit. Housing companies finance construction and renovation more and 
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more with credit that does its part in weakening households’ and lenders’ perception of their 
level of indebtedness. Positive credit register would be a beneficial tool in understanding 
household debt exposure and in restricting irresponsible lending and borrowing. Registering 
granted loans would need to be mandatory for all types of lenders, as it would be to verify 
borrower’s financial stability from the information available. Positive credit register would 
prevent increasing of the number of credit commitments household has, which is a major 
trigger of debt problems. On the other hand, lenders would be more easily made responsible 
for irresponsible lending as it could be verified that it has ignored the information available 
regarding household’s repayment capacities.  
 
The study succeeds to provide a comprehensive description of household over-indebtedness 
in Finland and to make comparisons to households in Sweden and the UK. The current 
phenomenon of over-indebtedness is examined widely from different perspectives. The study 
identifies several plausible determinants for over-indebtedness from household’s socio-
economic characteristics and circumstances and discusses the importance of behavioral biases 
and lack of financial literature based on previous literature. Determinants are examined by 
both the means of literature survey and empirical research using extensive micro-level data. 
The study succeeds to show plausible results of the impact of household socio-economic 
characteristics on their risk of over-indebtedness and is able identify risk groups of over-
indebtedness. Behavioral factors or financial literacy that were hypothesized to impact the 
risk of over-indebtedness could not be measured with the data in use, and the impact of them 
could not be accurately estimated. The impact of these factors on the results was however 
speculated based on the findings of previous literature presented. Main shortcomings of the 
research are the inability to measure the impact of income fluctuations or household’s debt 
exposure on the risk of over-indebtedness. Income shocks could be incorporated performing 
panel data estimation by using the longitudinal EU-SILC data. Incorporating also variables 
measuring household’s actual debt exposure and number of credit commitments would 
probably also have improved the accuracy of the results. 
 
An interesting aspect would have also been to study the triggers of payment defaults and 
determinants of over-indebtedness within the risk groups. Further research could find details 
of the triggers of over-indebtedness, which would enable targeting policy measures to 
alleviate the characteristic causes of different risk groups. The impact of financial literacy and 
its power in restricting irrational decision-making among Finnish consumers should also be 
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further examined. Behavioral biases persist even if individual is aware of the risks of their 
actions and is capable of performing financial calculations. The forms of financial education 
thus need to be closely examined and the results of current initiatives closely monitored to 
detect if financial education and teaching pre-commitment tools is effective in restricting 
myopic behavior. 
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